United Nations A/73/452–S/2018/951

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
25 October 2018

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-third session
Agenda items 35, 41 and 43

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 19 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In its written communication for the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba" (A/73/85), the Republic of Armenia once again made a false statement, the only purpose of which was to mislead the international community and deny its responsibility for apparent non-compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

In this connection, I would like to refer to documents A/71/627–S/2016/986 and A/71/831–S/2017/199, which contain our comprehensive response to Armenia's falsifications, and should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35, 41 and 43, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-17835 (E) 291018

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United Nations S/2018/952

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 October 2018
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 25 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for 23–25 October 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

18-18167 (E) 311018 011118

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Annex to the letter dated 25 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (23 October 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The number of violations by illegal armed groups operating in the Idlib de-escalation area has decreased.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported one incident of gunfire in the Governorate of Ladhiqiyah.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides has not carried out any humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours.

In total, 1,972 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 3,084.8 tons.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (24 October 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

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Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The number of violations by illegal armed groups active in the Idlib de-escalation area has not decreased.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported 11 incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: 5 in Aleppo, 5 in Ladhiqiyah and 1 in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any violations.

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United Nations S/2018/953

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 October 2018

Original: English

Credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Report of the Secretary-General

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 24 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Ms. Amy Lois Townsend has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

18-17870 (E) 261018

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United Nations S/2018/954

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 October 2018

Original: English

Credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Report of the Secretary-General

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 25 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Ms. Natalie Elizabeth Palmer has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

18-17878 (E) 261018

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United Nations S/2018/955

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 October 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 24 October 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the appointment of my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan effective 1 August 2011 to assist the parties in reaching a negotiated settlement of the residual Comprehensive Peace Agreement and post-secession issues after the closure of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan in 2011.

In addition to the recent progress in the South Sudan peace process, the rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia has created positive momentum for peace and security in the Horn of Africa and beyond. We expect that the dialogue initiated between Djibouti and Eritrea will facilitate the resolution of the remaining challenges in their relationship. As regional leaders embark on efforts to sustain recent gains and to open a new chapter of cooperation, they will need the support and assistance of the international community. Our consultation with them has shown that the interrelated political and security dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea have far-reaching implications for the security and prosperity of the broader region.

In view of the above, I have decided to expand the remit of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan to cover the Horn of Africa region, defined for this purpose to comprise the members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). By doing so, the new responsibilities of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa will be in line with the framework for cooperation between the United Nations and IGAD signed in Djibouti on 17 November 2015. The Special Envoy will also work in close collaboration with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel for Sudan, allowing for closer and streamlined collaboration among the United Nations, the African Union and IGAD.

In addition to the functions thus far performed by the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan, the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa will have the following additional functions:

(a) Work closely with, support and assist IGAD and other relevant subregional and regional organizations in consolidating recent gains in peace and security, and enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting issues;

(b) Carry out good offices and special assignments on behalf of the Secretary-General, and, in cooperation with IGAD and other regional and subregional organizations, as appropriate, enhance subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation;

(c) Complement the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to advise the Secretary-General and other senior United Nations officials on matters relating to

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peace and security in the region and the role that the United Nations can play in support of regional initiatives and efforts;

(d) Enhance linkages in the work of the United Nations and other partners in the subregion, with a view to promoting a joined-up regional approach and facilitating coordination and information exchange within the United Nations system, with due regard to the specific mandates of United Nations organizations as well as peacekeeping operations and special political missions; and

(e) Report to Headquarters on developments of subregional significance that are of interest and concern to the United Nations.

The staffing and other requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa will be met through existing resources.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

United Nations S/2018/956

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 October 2018

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Myanmar

Summary

The present report, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) and subsequent resolutions, covers the period from 1 July 2017 to 31 August 2018 and is the fifth report on children and armed conflict in Myanmar submitted to the Security Council and its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. As requested by the Working Group, the report updates my previous report on children and armed conflict in Myanmar (S/2017/1099) submitted in December 2017.

The report provides information on grave violations against children in Myanmar, with particular emphasis on the crisis in northern Rakhine State as well as areas of ongoing conflict in Kachin and Shan States and identifies parties to the conflict responsible for such violations. During the reporting period, armed clashes in conflict-affected areas of the country continued to put children at risk and the country task force on monitoring and reporting documented and verified grave violations against children perpetrated by the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) as well as other parties to the armed conflict listed in my previous annual reports, with the notable addition of a new group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, operating in northern Rakhine State and adjacent areas.

In the report, I also look at progress and challenges in addressing and preventing grave violations in Myanmar and provide recommendations for the deliberations of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict on the situation.

18-17972 (E) 151118

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I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) and subsequent resolutions, covers the period from 1 July 2017 to 31 August 2018 and updates my fourth report on children and armed conflict in Myanmar (S/2017/1099) submitted to the Security Council and its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict in December 2017. The report provides an overview of political and security developments, examines trends and patterns of violations committed against children and highlights progress made in ending and preventing such violations since the issuance of the previous report. It also contains a series of recommendations aimed at strengthening action for the protection of children affected by armed conflict in Myanmar.

II. Overview of security developments

A. Developments in Rakhine State

2. Prior to the reporting period, the security situation in northern Rakhine State was already characterized by military clearance operations by the Myanmar Armed Forces and intercommunal tensions and violence. The situation dramatically deteriorated on 25 August 2017 when the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army attacked 30 Myanmar police posts and an army base in northern Rakhine State in a coordinated manner. The incident triggered an immediate response from the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) and the border guard police, wherein the Rohingya community was overwhelmingly affected. According to numerous eyewitness accounts, Government forces, with the support of civilian mobs, perpetrated grave violations against civilians, including children, largely in Rohingya communities, during their response to the attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. Vigilantism, in combination with the response by the Government forces, compounded the vulnerability of civilians. Reports of the destruction of Rohingya and other minority villages continued to be documented for several months, including in 2018. As at the end of August 2018, 706,000 civilians had fled to Bangladesh, of whom over 90 per cent were Rohingya. More than 60 per cent of those civilians were children and women. Movements of population to Bangladesh slowed only towards the end of 2017; small-scale departures continued, however, amid ongoing reports of arson attacks, looting, harassment, loss of livelihoods and limited access to food and other services owing mainly to continued restrictions on freedom of movement by Government forces.

3. While the Rohingya continue to leave northern Rakhine owing to ongoing fear, intimidation, arrests, extortion and other protection incidents, a considerable number of them, mostly children, remain in Rakhine State and are in need of protection and assistance. Of those remaining, some 129,000 are forced to reside in camps in central Rakhine. The restrictions placed on their freedom of movement limits their access to food, jobs, education, health care and other basic services. Those in camps are almost completely dependent on humanitarian assistance for their survival. In addition, they suffer from overcrowding and lack of privacy and poor facilities and shelter that are in urgent need of improvement until durable solutions are found.

4. In addition, a large number of Muslims (primarily Rohingya but also Kaman) live in villages and towns in central Rakhine. Their freedom of movement is severely restricted owing to Government regulations and discrimination. All Muslims are subjected to this restriction on movement. The impact of the lack of freedom of movement is enormous, as Muslim communities in villages and internally displaced person camps have access to extremely limited government services and are not

allowed to work, seek medical care, visit family or receive an education freely and without restrictions.

5. Conditions in Rakhine are not considered to be conducive for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of the refugees in Bangladesh. The memorandum of understanding signed between the Government of Myanmar and the United Nations on 6 June 2018 is aimed at supporting the efforts of the Government in respect of the creation of such conditions and supporting recovery and resilience-based development for the benefit of all communities living in Rakhine State. However, to date, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Development Programme, which are signatories to the memorandum, have not been given effective access to northern Rakhine State to assess current needs and plan for interventions to improve conditions, build trust and promote social cohesion among all remaining communities, and prepare for the eventual repatriation of refugees as and when they make a free and informed choice to return. The access recently granted was only for 23 individual villages and three village tracts; a second phase, with access to a few more villages, has commenced. Full and unfettered humanitarian access is needed for all humanitarian actors to provide assistance and protection services to people in need in northern Rakhine State. Furthermore, the country task force on monitoring and reporting has sought unfettered access for monitoring and reporting as well as response activities for children, which the Government has yet to grant.

6. The Government has stated that it intends to "close" internally displaced person camps in central Rakhine. However, the indications so far are that the process of "camp closure" consists of upgrading shelters in or near locations where the camps are currently located, rather than a dignified solution that may include allowing people to return to their places of origin or to locations of their choosing. Displaced Rohingya and Kaman communities have not been allowed any increased freedom of movement.

B. Developments in other parts of the country

7. In other parts of the country, fighting between the Tatmadaw and several non-State armed groups and clashes between armed groups continued to affect civilians, including children. Active combat has made access for humanitarian operations difficult and has led to the displacement of thousands of civilians, including children, in Kachin and Shan States. There are currently some 105,500 civilians displaced in Kachin and northern Shan States, including approximately 48,000 children. In Kachin State, ongoing fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Army has intensified in recent months, particularly since the beginning of 2018. Armed clashes included the use of heavy weapons and artillery fire as well as aerial bombardment in several areas, leading to displacement and re-displacement of this already vulnerable population. In northern Shan State, clashes involving several ethnic armed organizations as well as the Tatmadaw continued to impact civilians. Clashes between the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army South and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army broke out in early 2018. Armed clashes also took place between the Ta'ang National Liberation Army and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army. More than 20,000 persons have been newly displaced or re-displaced owing to armed conflict in Kachin and Shan States since the beginning of 2018.

8. In Chin State, the Arakan Army and the Arakan Liberation Army reportedly clashed near the border triangle among Bangladesh, India and Myanmar over a territorial dispute. In addition, there was renewed fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army troops in 2018.

9. In Kayin State, fighting broke out between the Tatmadaw and the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army in territory controlled by the Karen National Liberation Army. In early 2018, fighting broke out between a combined force of the Tatmadaw and the border guard force against the Karen National Liberation Army and its allied Democratic Karen Benevolent Army splinter group.

C. Political developments

10. The third session of the Union Peace Conference (21st-Century Panglong Conference) was held in Nay Pyi Taw from 11 to 16 July 2018. A 14-point agreement was adopted, covering the political, economic, social and land and natural environment sectors and including a specific commitment to "eliminate six grave violations against children". The four listed armed group signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, namely, the Karenni National Progress Party/Karenni Army, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South, remain engaged in the peace process. Meanwhile, the Federal Political Negotiation Consultative Committee, also known as the "Northern Alliance", an alliance of seven armed group non-signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, which includes two listed parties (the United Wa State Army and the Kachin Independence Organization), attended the opening ceremony as "observers" and met with high-level Government and military officials. They vowed to continue peace talks with the Government. Two additional sessions of the Union Peace Conference are planned for 2019.

III. Grave child rights violations

11. The United Nations documented a total of 1,166 grave violations affecting children in the reporting period across all three northern townships, namely, Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung in Rakhine State. The vast majority of these cases were recorded after 25 August 2017. The information provided below is based mainly on interviews with refugees from Myanmar conducted in Bangladesh by the United Nations and covers exclusively incidents perpetrated in Rakhine State. Verification was carried out according to United Nations verification standards. Owing to lack of access for the Security Council-mandated country task force on monitoring and reporting in Myanmar, it was not possible to undertake direct and independent verification in-country. Owing to these access restrictions, together with the fear of reprisals and the stigma associated with the nature of grave violations, particularly rape and other forms of sexual violence, it is likely that the figures and information provided below are a significant underrepresentation of the scale of violence and impact on children in Rakhine State.

12. The Government of Myanmar has informed my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict that pocket manuals summarizing the rules of engagement were provided to all soldiers to remind them of guidance and directives to respect humanitarian law in the exercise of their operations in northern Rakhine. However, my country task force has not been able to observe these manuals or other efforts of the Tatmadaw to date and hopes to engage in intensive prevention activities as soon as possible.

A. Killing and maiming

13. The United Nations documented 708 child casualties (669 killed and 39 maimed), out of which it was possible to verify 220 child casualties (196 killed and 24 maimed) across 28 villages in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung Townships. Verified casualties included 133 boys and 51 girls, while the gender of 36 children was unknown. A total of 97 per cent of verified cases (198 casualties) took place after 25 August 2017. All verified cases were attributed to the Tatmadaw, with the involvement in some instances of the border guard police and special forces. The United Nations received additional highly credible reports of the large-scale killing and massacre of 99 members of the Hindu population, including children, by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army in villages in Maungdaw Township on 25 August 2017. It also documented two child casualties allegedly perpetrated by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and hopes to be able to further document cases once access to northern Rakhine is granted by the Government of Myanmar.

14. Children were killed and injured during apparent large-scale, widespread, systematic and organized attacks on the Rohingya civilian population by Government forces, including the Tatmadaw and the border guard police. The United Nations specifically verified the death and injury of children during large-scale massacres of civilians in the week following 25 August in Min Gyi village, Maungdaw Township (57 killed and 4 maimed); Chut Pyin village, Rathedaung Township (verifying 9 killed and 1 maimed out of a reported 135 children killed); and Chin Tha Mar village tract in Buthidaung Township (28 killed).

15. For example, several witnesses related that on 27 August 2017, in Buthidaung Township, Tatmadaw soldiers, including a corporal from Battalion 564, soldiers from Battalion 552 and additional troops brought in early in the morning by boat and trucks from another military base, surrounded the village. Men and boys were taken from houses. They had their hands tied and were forced to lie down on the ground. Witnesses saw the men and boys being killed one by one. At least 28 boys between the ages of 8 and 17 years were killed. Some of the bodies were taken to military trucks while others were buried in a field. Two witnesses estimated that approximately 200 people had been killed during the incident.

16. In an incident of a similar nature, on 27 August in Chut Pyin village, Rathedaung Township, witnesses reported that Tatmadaw soldiers, accompanied by Rakhine villagers carrying firearms, surrounded the village and at approximately 1400 hours started setting houses on fire one by one with torches and shooting at villagers fleeing the burning houses. At least nine children between the ages of 1 and 17 years were shot and killed during the incident. Witnesses who went back to the village the next day reported seeing burnt houses and corpses all over the village. Reports indicate that up to 135 children, 80 boys and 55 girls, may have been killed during incidents that unfolded on that day in the village.

17. In similar patterns of operational tactics committed by the Tatmadaw and the border guard police across all three affected townships after 25 August, at least 46 children were reported shot dead, including at close range, and 11 children shot and maimed.

18. For example, witnesses reported soldiers surrounding a village in Maungdaw Township on 29 August. The next morning at dawn, they started to shoot randomly into the village and at the houses. A female witness recounted having fled her home. When she found a hiding place, she looked back at her house and saw her 16-year-old disabled sister being shot in the back by a soldier in a uniform with a gun.

19. In addition, the United Nations verified accounts of children being pursued and shot at by the Tatmadaw and the border guard police as they attempted to flee violence and attacks on their villages and homes.

20. In an incident in Maungdaw Township, three children (two boys and one girl) attempted to flee the violence in their village of Tha Yet Oke and reunite with their mother on the other side of the river by boarding a riverboat. A military gunboat with Tatmadaw soldiers dressed in green uniforms opened fire from approximately 200 metres away. The two brothers, aged 5 and 8 years, were shot dead, while their 16-year-old sister survived the incident.

B. Rape and other forms of sexual violence

21. The United Nations has received numerous consistent reports of rape and sexual violence committed against hundreds of girls and women by the Tatmadaw following the launch of the counteroffensive of 25 August and was able to specifically document at least 41 cases, involving children in 15 villages across all three townships in northern Rakhine State. No reports of sexual violence against boys were recorded. Noting the additional ethical and security considerations necessary while engaging with child victims of sexual violence, the United Nations was able to verify eight cases and assess two others as highly credible, in nine villages, across all three townships. All verified cases were attributed to the Tatmadaw. The youngest girl was 10 years old. It is likely that these figures significantly underrepresent the true scale of sexual violence perpetrated against girls, owing to access restrictions, the stigma associated with rape and other sexual violence and other barriers to reporting.

22. Girls were raped by Tatmadaw personnel in houses, in the jungle, the forest and publicly in outdoor village areas. In addition, eyewitness and survivor accounts confirm that women and girls were raped in schools. For reasons of the safety of the victims and informants, the villages are not identified in some cases described below.

23. In one incident, during an attack by soldiers on a village in Maungdaw Township, a girl was raped by a member of the armed forces in the local school. She survived the incident and reported that women and girls had been rounded up in the local school by soldiers. She was one of several women and girls who were raped in the school at that time.

24. In some cases, girls were killed following attacks on their homes and villages or died as a result of multiple physical injuries sustained during the assault. Several rape cases led to severe injury and an urgent need for child-specific sexual and reproductive health-care services. In a number of incidents, girls were gang-raped by up to four Tatmadaw soldiers.

25. In an incident in Rathedaung Township, a girl was raped and beaten by four members of the Tatmadaw during an attack on her village. According to her testimony, she was able to identify them as Tatmadaw because of their uniform and the badge of one of the perpetrators. In another incident of a similar nature, on 4 November in Maungdaw Township, a woman reported witnessing her 14-year-old daughter being gang-raped by two Tatmadaw soldiers, identified by their uniforms, while at least 10 other soldiers stood around and witnessed the incident. She reported that the incident lasted approximately four hours. Afterwards, her daughter was shot in the head and killed in front of her.

26. Rapes of girls and women also occurred in villages where there were large-scale massacres of the Rohingya population by the Tatmadaw. For example, in a village in Maungdaw Township, a survivor described the systematic round-up of groups of girls and women who were taken to houses and then raped. She reported that when the

military attack started, hundreds of villagers fled to a nearby beach. Soldiers separated them on the beach into groups and shot all the men, killing the majority. Groups of women and girls were then taken by soldiers to houses that had not yet been burned. A group of six women and girls, including the witness, was taken to a house where they were all raped by soldiers. When the soldiers left the house, they closed the windows and locked the doors and then set fire to the house. In that particular incident, only the witness and her seven-year-old daughter managed to escape while the other four burned to death, including one 17-year-old girl.

C. Recruitment and use

27. During 2017, the country task force on monitoring and reporting continued to receive reports of the border guard police using boys as young as 10 years old in support functions and as part of a wider practice requiring all male Rohingyas to work for the border guard police, of which it was able to verify 53 cases. The verified cases occurred in villages across three northern townships. The majority of cases were attributable to the border guard police and some to the Tatmadaw. Males were rounded up in their villages as and when needed and were also required to regularly perform a quota of labour per family in a form of forced labour. This was often in coordination with a village administrator and included functions such as border guard police camp construction and maintenance, cleaning, cooking, collecting firewood or serving as sentinels. The United Nations was able to verify the use of 47 boys, aged 10 to 17 years, by the border guard police in such roles. The boys were often forced to work through the night and suffered humiliation, threats and punishments such as physical assaults as well as monetary fines for minor disobedience of orders.

28. For example, in a village in Maungdaw Township, a 17-year-old Rohyinga boy worked for the border guard police four to six times per month. He was forced to cook, clean, collect wood, do construction work and act as a sentinel. He was forced to do this work because his father was too old and could not meet the requirement that every household send one male to the border guard police post to work. The boy was arrested three times for failing to report for duty and was severely beaten and fined. When accused of sleeping during sentinel duty, the boy was forced to hand over family livestock and to pay additional fines. The boy worked alongside other children; the last time he worked as a sentinel was two weeks before 25 August 2017, when he was with four other boys aged 14 to 17 years.

29. The United Nations verified the use of six boys, aged between 10 and 18 years, in Sein Hnyin Pyar village, Buthidaung Township, by the Tatmadaw on 28 August 2017. The boys were used to carry military equipment between locations during military operations.

30. Information on the recruitment and use by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army of boys aged as young as 10 years was also documented and one case was verified. Although circumstantial evidence points to a larger number of cases, the country task force on monitoring and reporting in Myanmar has yet to obtain the access necessary to verify them on the ground and awaits permission to do so from the Government of Myanmar. Complete documentation of violations perpetrated by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army may also have been impeded by the fear of reprisals among refugees in Bangladesh.

D. Additional grave child rights violations

31. The United Nations verified 11 incidents of attacks on schools attributed to the Tatmadaw, including the burning of madrasas in villages across the three affected

townships of northern Rakhine (Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung). For example, on 17 September in Gaw Du Thar Ra village, Maungdaw Township, three religious schools, which used to host approximately 1,500 students, were burned down by the Tatmadaw. All educational material was also burned. Schools were also used by the Tatmadaw as barracks as well as locations where women and girls were raped. In addition, the United Nations documented the widespread disappearance of boys and girls, including numerous girls abducted and raped by Myanmar armed forces, and boys being commonly included within the round-up of male members of a village under attack by Government forces and taken away to unknown destinations. The Organization documented the arrest of 16 boys by the border guard police and armed forces for their alleged association with armed opposition groups in Rakhine State and for alleged "terrorism" and "illegal (military) training". Humanitarian access to the three affected townships in northern Rakhine was systematically denied after 25 August 2017.

IV. Progress in ending and preventing grave violations by armed forces and groups in Myanmar

32. In May 2018, at the invitation of the Government of Myanmar, my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict conducted a three-day visit to Myanmar. She met with the State Counsellor, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services and relevant Government ministries and the Union Advocate General. She also met the technical members of the Committee on the Prevention of Underage Recruitment (Tatmadaw/Government), the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee and representatives from three listed armed groups (the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army South, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army and the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council). The visit was aimed at engaging with the Government and the Tatmadaw to: (a) accelerate the implementation of the Joint Action Plan to end underage recruitment signed in 2012 by the Tatmadaw and the country task force on monitoring and reporting; (b) raise concerns regarding emerging trends of grave violations; (c) encourage the Government to take preventive measures and to pass the draft law on child rights and ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict; (d) advocate for access to conflict-affected areas for monitoring purposes; and (e) inform the Government of the engagement of the country task force on monitoring and reporting to develop/sign joint commitments with seven ethnic armed organizations listed in my annual report on children and armed conflict.

33. My Special Representative stressed the need for accelerated implementation of the Joint Action Plan through the streamlining of the United Nations/Government joint workplan adopted in 2014, following the review of achievements, progress and lessons learned to date. In that regard, she urged the Government of Myanmar to: (a) achieve and sustain a pattern of "no new child recruitment"; (b) expedite the verification and release of pending cases of suspected minors; (c) demonstrate a stronger commitment to enforcing all the control measures and due diligence to end underage recruitment throughout the ranks of the Tatmadaw; (d) cease the detention of children for desertion or being absent without leave and apply the benefit of the doubt for those whose age is uncertain in accordance with the Tatmadaw directives; and (e) actively prevent the use of children to give full realization to the 2016 military directive prohibiting such use.

34. My Special Representative informed the Government of the engagement of the country task force on monitoring and reporting to develop and sign joint commitments with all seven listed ethnic armed organizations with a view to developing and signing

action plans to end underage recruitment and strengthen the protection of children, in accordance with its mandate under Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) and subsequent resolutions.

35. My Special Representative expressed her strong concerns regarding emerging trends of other grave violations of child rights in Myanmar. She repeatedly emphasized the importance of prevention and urged the Government to initiate measures to prevent such violations, including through the inclusion of child protection issues in the ongoing peace dialogue. As new trends were coming to light, including strong allegations of killing and maiming and sexual violence, the Special Representative also stressed the importance of granting the country task force on monitoring and reporting unfettered access to better monitor, report and respond to child protection issues in conflict-affected areas of northern Rakhine, Shan and Kachin States.

36. In June 2018, I listed the Tatmadaw and integrated border guard forces in my annual report to the Security Council for the grave violations of killing and maiming of children and grave sexual violence against children, necessitating engagement with those parties in the development of action plans to address and prevent such violations.

37. Following the visit of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, steady progress was noted in the implementation of the Joint Action Plan by the Government and on the engagement of the country task force on monitoring and reporting with the Government in that regard. This included high-level and technical-level meetings held in July 2018 to review the progress and challenges to date. Key results from the meetings included: (a) the joint development and adoption of a revised workplan with sharper indicators to measure progress towards completion; (b) significant progress on the issue of age verification for children with no or inconsistent documentation; (c) a revised methodology for the joint monitoring of military units by the country task force on monitoring and reporting, with increased transparency and objectivity with respect to the criteria used by the task force to assess the compliance of battalions with the Joint Action Plan and a more structured and action-oriented reporting system to ensure that recommendations from battalion-monitoring missions are properly shared with and acted upon by Tatmadaw units.

38. During the reporting period, 75 children and young people who had been recruited as children were released by the Tatmadaw within the framework of the Joint Action Plan, bringing the total of such releases since 2012 to 924 as at the end of August 2018.

39. The supplementary understanding between the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Government (ILO complaints mechanism for the elimination of forced labour) was extended by one year with the renewed agreement that ILO would continue to refer underage recruitment to the country task force on monitoring and reporting as long as the age and circumstances of recruitment fell within the mandate of the task force.

40. At the third session of the Union Peace Conference, an important agreement was reached with respect to the mainstreaming of child protection and prevention of grave violations in the peace process. The agreement set out a commitment to "set up and conduct programmes to ensure child rights, abide by the Convention on the Rights of the Child for all-round development of children and eliminate the six grave violations against children".

41. In addition, the new draft law on child rights was submitted to the Union Parliament in July 2017 and is currently under review. The law explicitly prohibits the six grave violations under Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) and places

them squarely in national legislation. It is unclear, however, when the draft law will be adopted.

42. With regard to accountability measures, since 2012, 448 army officers have been disciplined in accordance with the military code of conduct for failure to follow the proper recruitment process. One civilian has been prosecuted for involvement in illegal recruitment. The Government's anti-trafficking working group recognizes that civilian-facilitated underage recruitment/use is to be included in the mandate of the Committee on the Prevention of Underage Recruitment.

43. Advocacy and outreach by the Special Representative has resulted in greater willingness on the part of the Government to engage on the issue of the six grave violations, and a request has been made for the assistance of the Office of the Special Representative in the provision of training on the six grave violations in conjunction with the country task force on monitoring and reporting.

44. In August 2018, the Government responded to my Special Representative's request for access by the country task force on monitoring and reporting to affected areas of northern Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States, but only if the necessary safety conditions are in place. However, no formal response was ever provided to the formal requests for access formulated by the task force in writing, with support from the Special Representative, in March and June 2018, and there are indications that the nature and scope of the mission, despite being squarely within the mandate of the country task force on monitoring and reporting in Myanmar, may be the reason for the delayed response and lack of access to date.

45. Six out of seven listed armed groups, apart from the United Wa State Army, have continued to engage with the country task force on monitoring and reporting and have demonstrated a willingness to further collaborate, with the aim of strengthening the protection of children in their respective areas of engagement. The signing of joint commitments with listed armed groups will be a gradual process, starting with an initial emphasis on the four groups that are signatories to the National Ceasefire Agreement.

V. Recommendations

46. The recommendations below are specific to the period covered in the update report and should be considered in conjunction with the recommendations contained in my fourth report to the Security Council (S/2017/1099).

To the Government of Myanmar

47. Taking into account the concerns expressed by my Special Representative, I urge the Government to:

(a) In the light of the significant progress towards full compliance with the 2012 Joint Action Plan on ending the recruitment and use of children in the Tatmadaw, clear the current backlog of pending cases of suspected minors by the end of 2018, including by systematically applying the principle of the benefit of the doubt as reflected in the Joint Action Plan, to discharge suspected minors with no or *inconsistent documentation;*

(b) In the spirit of the Joint Action Plan and relevant national and international legal instruments, review and amend any legislation to preclude the detention and/or prosecution of children on charges related to illegal association with armed groups;

(c) Allow full and unimpeded access for humanitarian actors to all conflict-affected and displaced people in Myanmar, as well as safe and unimpeded access for the country task force on monitoring and reporting to conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas, particularly in northern Rakhine, and Kachin and Shan States, to carry out verification activities pertaining to its mandate vis-à-vis monitoring and reporting of the six grave violations;

(d) Engage with the country task force on monitoring and reporting to develop and implement agreed measures and establish a mechanism to develop and implement action plans for the additional violations of grave sexual violence and killing and maiming for which the Tatmadaw was listed in my most recent annual report on children and armed conflict;

(e) In the light of the notable number of prosecutions for recruitment and use of children to date, undertake an independent and credible investigation of and accountability for all six grave violations of child rights, in line with international standards, for the members of the Myanmar Armed Forces and the non-State actors who have been identified as perpetrators of these grave violations;

(f) Take stock of best practices in realizing concrete progress for children. In this regard, I would like to note with appreciation the inclusion of the prevention of the six grave violations in the commitments undertaken in the ongoing peace process and to encourage my Special Representative and the United Nations country team to support the Government and negotiating parties in realizing concrete progress for children;

(g) Ensure the swift adoption of the draft law on child rights, which could be a model piece of legislation for other countries affected by armed conflict or emerging from conflict, and the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict to strengthen the legal framework for children and armed conflict in Myanmar by the end of the year 2018.

To armed groups

48. I urge armed groups to:

(a) Immediately halt and prevent the recruitment and use of children and release all children present in their ranks. The listed parties are encouraged to prepare and implement joint commitments with the United Nations to end and prevent child recruitment and use;

(b) Ensure accountability, in line with international standards, for members of the non-State armed groups who have been identified as perpetrators of any of the six grave violations of child rights.

United Nations S/2018/957

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 November 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 26 October 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

We welcome the invitation to Hagai El-Ad, Director of the Israeli non-governmental organization B'Tselem, to brief the Security Council during the 18 October open debate on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. It was useful that a human rights dimension could be included in our discussions.

The Security Council's discussions are enriched by the invitations extended, the previous week as on many previous occasions, to independent civil society briefers. It is vital that these individuals can contribute to our meetings without facing negative consequences, including personal attacks or insults, either within or outside the Security Council Chamber. Therefore, the remarks made to Mr. El-Ad during the open debate by the Permanent Representative of Israel are deeply regrettable.

Those remarks were delivered in a language for which interpretation is not provided. This constitutes a breach of the procedures of the Council and of the basic rules which are intended to make sure that we understand each other within the Security Council, even when we disagree. It also undermines the point of an open debate. We request the presidency of the Security Council, as well as all incoming presidencies, to ensure that this incident does not set a precedent and that in general all speakers use one of the six official languages of the United Nations. We recall that briefers under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, as well as speakers under rule 37, participate in our meetings at the invitation of the Security Council members.

We kindly request that the present letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) François **Delattre**
Permanent Representative of France

(*Signed*) Karel **van Oosterom**
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

(*Signed*) Olof **Skoog**
Permanent Representative of Sweden

(*Signed*) Karen **Pierce**
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom

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United Nations S/2018/958

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Role of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

Special report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. In a statement by the President of the Security Council dated 30 June 2017 (S/PRST/2017/8) marking the closure of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the Council requested me to provide a comprehensive study of the role of UNOCI in settling the situation in Côte d'Ivoire. The present report takes into account the contributions of political mediation, the sanctions regime, and other relevant factors that allowed for the successful completion of the Operation's mandate. It draws on the findings of research conducted by an external consultant, commissioned by the Secretariat, and is based on broad consultations with Ivorian, regional and international stakeholders and United Nations officials, among other involved entities. It contains lessons learned and recommendations from the United Nations peacekeeping experience in Côte d'Ivoire, and identifies successes and the challenges outstanding at the time of the departure of UNOCI, with the overall aim of enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping in the future.

II. Background and context

The evolution of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

2. UNOCI deployed to Côte d'Ivoire on 4 April 2004, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1528 (2004), in which the Council authorized it to subsume, as from that date, the responsibilities of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), a political mission, and the forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which were "re-hatted" and absorbed within the United Nations peacekeeping operation.

3. Both ECOWAS and France had dispatched armed forces following the failed coup of September 2002 against the Government of President Laurent Gbagbo, effectively freezing the armed conflict by creating a buffer between the rebel-held north and the Government-controlled south. The mandate of UNOCI was based on the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement of 23 January 2003, which provided for the establishment of a government of national reconciliation, and in which the United Nations was requested to support the holding of elections following a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. In its early years UNOCI served primarily as an interposition force, with regional actors playing a leading role with respect to

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the political process while the host Government's lack of cooperation impeded its operations.

4. A significant turning point for UNOCI occurred with the signing, on 4 March 2007, of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, brokered by the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré. Following successive peace agreements mediated by regional partners, the Ouagadougou Agreement paved the way for elections, while reinforcing the United Nations electoral certification role. This brought UNOCI into the heart of the political process and provided the mission with leverage to move the political and electoral processes forward.

5. After the resolution of the post-electoral crisis of 2011, UNOCI activities shifted to accompanying the people and Government of Côte d'Ivoire in rebuilding their deeply divided country, with a focus on longer-term stabilization efforts such as national reconciliation and social cohesion, institutional reforms, and facilitating an environment conducive to the return of the tens of thousands of Ivorians displaced within the country and region during the crisis. The mission's final turning point aligned with the presidential elections of 2015, at which point planning for the downsizing of UNOCI and the eventual transition from peacekeeping, which had begun in 2013, was expedited. The consolidation of the political gains in 2016, through the peaceful conduct of legislative elections and the holding of a constitutional referendum that addressed, inter alia, the identity issue at the root of the Ivorian crisis, provided the backdrop for the transformation of the United Nations engagement in Côte d'Ivoire in 2017 and the withdrawal of UNOCI effective 30 June 2017.

6. Arguably the most significant contributing factor to the success of UNOCI was its clear mandate, backed by a unified Security Council, at the second decisive moment in its deployment: the contested presidential election of 2010. The unanimous adoption of resolution 1975 (2011) on 30 March 2011 paved the way for a resolution of the post-electoral crisis, which was made possible with the collaboration of ECOWAS and the African Union. They, together with the United Nations, recognized Alassane Ouattara as the democratically elected president and urged the defeated incumbent to relinquish power.

7. The principles of subsidiarity and complementarity, which govern relations between the regional economic communities, the African Union Peace and Security Council, and the United Nations Security Council, were mostly upheld throughout the life of UNOCI. ECOWAS initially deployed its peace operation to Côte d'Ivoire in April 2003 without seeking authorization from the Security Council. After the establishment of UNOCI in 2004, the renewal of the mandates of the United Nations operation in Côte d'Ivoire was initiated by ECOWAS and subsequently endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council before being put forward to the Security Council. Such a practice contributed to the enhancement of national and regional perceptions about the legitimacy of actions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations with regard to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire.

8. Follow-up mechanisms also played an important role in sustaining the engagement of regional and international partners, in particular the ministerial-level International Working Group, which helped to align subregional, regional and international views. Created by the African Union Peace and Security Council in October 2005 and subsequently endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 1633 (2005), the Working Group comprised Benin, France, Ghana, Guinea, the Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union, the World Bank and the International Organization of la Francophonie, and was co-chaired by the African Union and UNOCI, the presidency

alternating between the African Union and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOCI. The secretariat of the Working Group was coordinated by the United Nations. The Working Group ceased to exist after the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement in 2007.

Certification of elections

9. At Pretoria, on 6 April 2005, the Ivorian parties entrusted the United Nations with a unique election certification mandate aimed at providing an additional safeguard to guarantee the credibility of the Ivorian elections. On the basis of the Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire and in accordance with Security Council resolution 1603 (2005), the Secretary-General appointed a High Representative for the Elections in Côte d'Ivoire, to assist the Independent Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Council, with a mandate to verify that all stages of the electoral process provided necessary guarantees for the holding of free, fair and transparent elections. The mandate of the High Representative for the Elections was subsequently strengthened by resolution 1721 (2006), in which the Council designated him as the sole authority authorized to arbitrate with a view to preventing or resolving any problems or disputes related to the electoral process, in liaison with the Mediator.

10. After the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement in March 2007, some adjustments were made to the United Nations role in supporting the electoral process. Subsequently, in order to preserve the essence of the certification of the electoral process by the United Nations, a compromise solution was found. This entailed the transfer, under Security Council resolution 1765 (2007), of the certification of all stages of the electoral process from the High Representative for the Elections to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. In order to deliver on this new mandated task, the Special Representative was supported by a small certification cell within his office, distinct from the political or electoral assistance sections. This decision strengthened the political role and good offices functions of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. UNOCI and the Secretariat established the criteria for certifying all stages of the electoral process, which were agreed with the ECOWAS Facilitator and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1865 (2009).

11. The importance of the certification of the elections held in 2010 was clearly demonstrated during the post-electoral crisis when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General certified the results that were tabulated by the mission. Both UNOCI and the Independent Electoral Commission declared Mr. Ouattara the winner on 2 December 2010, whereas the Constitutional Council had proclaimed the incumbent, President Gbagbo, the winner. In order to generate political support for the way forward, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa (UNOWA) and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Côte d'Ivoire undertook a tour of African capitals to explain to key African stakeholders the importance of the certification mandate of UNOCI during the post-electoral crisis. The same effort was undertaken with key international stakeholders, particularly members of the Security Council.

Use of force in support of the mandate

12. ECOWAS and the African Union recognized the electoral outcomes as certified by the United Nations and provided a strong basis for decisive action by the Security Council, but the political impasse continued despite the efforts of the High-level Panel of the African Union. On 17 March 2011, Mr. Ouattara issued a decree, by which the former rebel group Forces nouvelles and members of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces were symbolically unified to create the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire. Soon after, the former Forces nouvelles members of the Forces républicaines began their advance on Abidjan and the fighting against the Defence and Security

Forces, which resulted in significant fatalities and forced displacement of the civilian population.

13. On 30 March 2011, in resolution 1975 (2011), the Security Council recalled its authorization of UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population. While UNOCI already had such authority, the resolution was a further demonstration of the Council's unity behind the mission's mandate and its right to use force, including against Ivorian defence and security forces. It also clarified the debate on whether the context was still one of peacekeeping or had transitioned to the need for peace enforcement.

14. As fighting in Abidjan intensified, and following the use of heavy weapons again against the population on 3 April 2011, UNOCI undertook a military operation to stop further attacks and threats, including against United Nations personnel. On 9 April, Mr. Gbagbo's forces launched an attack on the Golf Hotel, the temporary residence of President Ouattara's Government, prompting a response by the international forces. Two days later, forces loyal to President Ouattara arrested Mr. Gbagbo, as well as those who supported him.

III. Host country consent and quality of mission leadership

15. The basic principles of peacekeeping, which include the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence or in defence of the mandate, all came to the fore at various points during the Ivorian crisis. The consent of the host country proved particularly relevant in this context. It needs to be maintained throughout the lifespan of a peacekeeping operation to ensure the mission's effectiveness and the safety of its personnel. Initially, President Gbagbo consented to the deployment of UNOCI, seeing that it could serve as a buffer against the rebels to the north. However, he quickly challenged the mission by erecting obstacles to its operations including by disputing the provisions of the status-of-forces agreement, refusing to provide the mission with a frequency for its radio station, and impeding troop rotations.

16. Creating a separate High Representative for the Elections responsible for certification was an effort to preserve perceptions about the impartiality of UNOCI. Judging the function of the High Representative to be intrusive, President Gbagbo sought and obtained the departure of the then High Representative for the Elections, Gérard Stoudmann of Switzerland, in 2007. He also raised objections to candidates for the post of Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOCI, following the departure of Special Representative Pierre Schori of Sweden in February 2007, and the transfer of the certification mandate to the Special Representative (effectively merging the functions of the High Representative for the Elections and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General). He finally consented, after eight months, to the appointment of Young-Jin Choi, of the Republic of Korea, as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

17. After the Special Representative of the Secretary-General certified the results of the election on 3 December 2010, President Gbagbo's Government sent a letter to the Secretary-General, on 17 December, calling for the immediate departure of UNOCI. Mr. Gbagbo alleged that the mission was no longer impartial. He also refused the mission access to vital supplies, denied customs clearance for supplies at the port, cut off fuel supplies, revoked the landing rights of uniformed contingents rotating by air, denied UNOCI freedom of movement and prevented United Nations personnel from accessing the Golf Hotel where Mr. Ouattara and his Government were located.

18. Once ECOWAS, the African Union and the Security Council, after the certification by the Special Representative, recognized Mr. Ouattara as the legitimately elected president of the country, even if not yet sworn in, UNOCI required the consent of the new Government to continue operating in Côte d'Ivoire. The United Nations obtained the host Government's consent in writing from Mr. Ouattara on 18 December 2010.

19. At the same time, UNOCI made adjustments to its operations so that it could continue operating in a viable manner in the country. It had to airlift critical supplies, such as fuel, since most suppliers operating within the country had withdrawn their services as a result of threats made by forces loyal to Mr. Gbagbo. With support from United Nations Headquarters, UNOCI put in place arrangements to overcome these restrictions and ensure the delivery of supplies to mission personnel, as well as to the Golf Hotel. It did so by undertaking supply runs by air, establishing an alternative logistics base at Bouaké, and opening up alternate supply routes by road and air through neighbouring countries, among other measures. UNOCI and the Secretariat held different views regarding the continuing presence of a United Nations mission in the country under these circumstances. There were difficult discussions and decisions within the Council. In the end, the Secretary-General, on the advice of his senior officials, took a principled position that the United Nations must do all it could to stay.

20. One of the most crucial factors determining the success or failure of a mission is its leadership and its ability to communicate with and positively influence the behaviour of all key stakeholders and to manage the often difficult but always crucial consent of the host Government. Throughout the life cycle of UNOCI, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General maintained lines of communication with the host Government, including the President and/or his close advisers, and with key Ivorian political stakeholders, even during some of the most challenging times. Regardless of the perceptions of their relations with the host Government, Special Representatives extensively used their political role and good offices functions, particularly during the post-electoral crisis and from the start of the transition until the withdrawal of the mission. They worked closely with the region, and their work was complemented by the Secretariat's outreach with Member States in New York and in the capitals. Informed by advice from Headquarters and guided by United Nations principles, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General took calculated political risks. A key lesson learned is that Special Representatives play a political role for which they must have the personality, political profile, experience, and communication skills to undertake difficult diplomatic démarches. It is also important that Special Representatives have the judgment to know which issues must be swiftly brought to the attention of Headquarters, including emerging dynamics among regional players that could be utilized by national actors to impede the peace process.

IV. Uniformed components and security posture

21. From 2004 to 2008, UNOCI faced several challenges that tested its posture and credibility. The Operation's first test as an interposition force came in October 2004, when Government forces launched a military operation against the Forces nouvelles. Several hundred Ivorian troops crossed the zone of confidence into the north, despite the efforts of UNOCI to prevent their campaign. Those Government forces also engaged in air bombings, one of which killed nine French soldiers in Bouaké, thereby triggering a response by the French forces of Operation Licorne, which destroyed, inter alia, all Ivorian military aircraft. This episode, which led to the death of civilians and soldiers, was a serious blow to the peace process, and raised fundamental questions about the purpose of the peacekeeping force. However, even in the face of

those challenges, UNOCI successfully protected fleeing civilians in Bouaké. Together with Operation Licorne, it also secured the Golf Hotel and protected United Nations personnel and installations.

22. Managing violent demonstrations was a persistent challenge faced by UNOCI. Three formed police units were added to UNOCI to reinforce existing crowd control capacities and to protect United Nations personnel installations and equipment, particularly in Abidjan. Notwithstanding the linguistic barriers among non-francophone formed police units, they helped to facilitate crowd control, and proved essential in January 2006 when massive demonstrations against the Working Group's proposal to dissolve the Ivorian parliament were staged in Abidjan and other cities. However, the additional police units were insufficient to overcome the lawlessness in the zone of confidence, which was patrolled by the impartial forces. International forces had no authority to either arrest or detain the perpetrators.

23. During that same period, unprofessional behaviour and allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by some peacekeepers negatively affected the mission's image. An important lesson learned is the need to ensure that efforts are sustained throughout a mission's life cycle to prevent incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse and provide necessary assistance to victims of abuse, in line with the Secretary-General's zero tolerance policy.

Protecting political stakeholders

24. UNOCI provided security for senior officials of the transitional Government and signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, notwithstanding the Government's primary responsibility for protecting its citizens. In a context of trust-building, this arrangement helped to enhance the security and confidence of key actors in the peace process. Specifically, it facilitated the return to Abidjan of Force nouvelles personalities such as Guillaume Soro and opposition presidential candidates, including the former President, Henri Konan Bédié, and Alassane Ouattara in 2005. UNOCI also provided security to financial institutions and other Ivorian personnel to facilitate the restoration of administration and public services in the north of the country. The UNOCI special protection group was reinforced with an additional 76 personnel, bringing it to 282 all ranks, in addition to 135 Ivorian gendarmes and Forces nouvelles elements that received close protection training from the Government of South Africa.

25. Preserving the democratic will of the Ivorian people during the post-electoral crisis of 2010/2011 included ensuring the adequate protection of Mr. Ouattara at the Golf Hotel. The mission progressively reinforced its deployments of troops and formed police units around the hotel and its premises. As a consequence, UNOCI successfully repelled the attack launched on 9 April 2011 by pro-Gbagbo forces on the Golf Hotel.

Security strategy supported by a parallel international force, inter-mission arrangements and an innovative quick reaction capability

26. The French force Operation Licorne was authorized by the Security Council in resolution 1528 (2004). In a unique arrangement, the independent operation under national command was mandated to use all necessary means to support UNOCI. The French force was critical throughout the deployment of UNOCI owing to its solid knowledge of the terrain, good tactical and strategic intelligence, and firepower that included air support. UNOCI thus benefited from the sustained political engagement of France as a permanent member of the Security Council. Operation Licorne served as an enabling force and a force multiplier for UNOCI. The two forces largely complemented one another, which facilitated operations such as rescuing stranded diplomats and neutralizing heavy weapons during the post-electoral crisis. At the

same time, there may have been an over-reliance on the French forces because UNOCI lacked professional reserve or quick reaction capabilities. There also was a need for better coordination, as shown by the response of Operation Licorne to the Bouaké bombing in 2004.

27. Inter-mission cooperation among the contiguous missions in West Africa was also envisaged to maximize strategic and operational interdependence. The Security Council in resolution 1609 (2005) provided for the temporary redeployment of police and military units from one mission to another to address challenges that could not be managed within the authorized personnel ceiling of the receiving mission, subject to the consent of the host country and the troop- or police-contributing country and the approval of the Security Council. Accordingly, UNOCI was reinforced on several occasions by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL): in January 2006 after violent disturbances in Abidjan and during the 2010 presidential and 2011 legislative elections. Late in 2010 and early in 2011, three infantry companies and aviation assets from UNMIL were temporarily redeployed to UNOCI. They provided critical reinforcement that initially played an important rapid reaction and dissuasion role. They had a decisive role when using force under resolution 1975 (2011) to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population. UNOCI, in turn, reinforced UNMIL during the presidential and legislative elections in Liberia in October and November 2011.

28. Owing to cross-border instability, UNOCI and UNMIL launched a series of cross-border activities such as joint air patrols, concurrent border patrols and coordinated border operations. They also undertook civilian cross-border activities and quadripartite meetings that brought together actors from the missions and the host Governments. Their cooperation measures included a wide range of substantive cross-border stabilization activities, in support of national and local authorities, which continued until the closure of UNOCI. Such activities included information-sharing on small arms and light weapons, including for embargo monitoring, and cooperation on human rights, child protection and rule of law issues, public information campaigns and humanitarian action. The two missions, together with UNOWA, also supported ECOWAS and the Mano River Union in developing and implementing a regional strategy for addressing cross-border threats through local reconciliation projects that were supported by the Peacebuilding Fund.

29. In view of the ongoing drawdown of the peacekeeping operations in West Africa, the establishment of a regional quick reaction force was proposed to the Security Council on the basis of the joint strategic review of UNOCI and UNMIL conducted in February 2014. The force would serve as a rapid response capability within the existing resources of the missions and as a mitigation measure to address potential crises under the framework of inter-mission cooperation, with the added flexibility that the Secretariat could, in extremis, take the decision to deploy the unit outside of its parent mission. A battalion of 650 personnel was considered credible and would be deployed on the basis of threat assessment, mandated tasks and resources available. It would comprise two motorized infantry companies, one mechanized infantry company and the necessary support elements, including air assets, to undertake military operations across the missions' areas of responsibility.

30. The Security Council by resolution 2162 (2014) authorized the establishment of the quick reaction force within UNOCI. Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General proceeded with the deployment of the unit to Liberia for up to 90 days without further permission from the Council. Previously, the Council had also authorized the missions to share military aviation assets, without prejudice to their respective areas of responsibility, an arrangement that continued until the closure of UNOCI. These innovations were a significant demonstration of the Council's trust in the Secretariat and were facilitated by the cooperation of the host countries and the

readiness of the troop-contributing countries to assume additional responsibilities. Senegal, which was selected to form the quick reaction force owing to its peacekeeping experience in both Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, proactively upgraded its capabilities as necessary for the success of the experiment. Although it was never required to deploy in Liberia, a portion of the quick reaction force was sent to the Central African Republic in 2015. By resolution 2295 (2016), the Security Council authorized the transfer of the quick reaction force to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), where it retained its responsibility to respond in Liberia, in extremis, until the closure of UNMIL in 2018.

31. The structure and composition of the quick reaction force have been identified as good practices and should be considered a model for such units. Identified shortcomings pertain to the need for adequate readiness and the ability of the recipient mission to absorb reinforcements. There is a need for future quick reaction forces to undergo regular exercises as part of the planning process, raising the challenge of how to cover the cost of such exercises given the nature of mission budgeting. Further refinements of the concept are required to address, inter alia, the respective financial responsibilities of the missions and contributing countries involved and the minimum detachable strength, as well as to shorten the timeframe for the rapid response. It is also important to avoid any caveats that could hamper the quick reaction force's operational employability: where possible, the framework should prioritize military rather than civilian aviation and other enabling assets.

V. Other substantive engagement of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire Extension of State authority

32. An important part of the early mandate of UNOCI pertained to the restoration of State authority of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire throughout the country and helping to prepare for the future reunification of the country. This involved accompanying the redeployment of the administration, including judiciary and police. After the post-electoral crisis, a major challenge became unifying the tax collection system and State treasury, as the Forces nouvelles had been collecting revenues and selling resources in the north for years.

Rule of law and security institutions

33. The protracted Ivorian crisis eroded the confidence of the Ivorian population in its justice and security providers. Following the crisis of 2010/2011, the justice system practically ceased to function, and serious violations threatened social cohesion and reconciliation efforts throughout the country. More than half of the prisons in the country were destroyed and more than 12,000 inmates escaped.

34. UNOCI played a critical role in extending State authority throughout the country. It helped to deploy judicial personnel and to reopen courts of first instance, appeals courts and new tribunals. UNOCI also supported the reopening of some prisons, including the main prison in Abidjan, which had ceased to function during the crisis. In partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations, the mission contributed to notable improvements in the Ivorian prisons, leading to more humane conditions of detention. The mission also supported the Government in developing prisoner data management systems as well as a national justice sector strategy and helped to implement justice reform projects financed by international partners. In addition, as part of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, 2,000 ex-combatants were integrated into the prison system as prison officers.

35. UNOCI support for the reform and restructuring of the national security institutions and the capacity-building of the two national law enforcement agencies contributed to the redeployment of the police and the gendarmerie nationwide. In addition, joint patrols of UNOCI and Ivorian police helped to rebuild public trust in the police and gendarmerie and contributed to the wider reconciliation process. UNOCI also supported, through mentoring, training-of-trainers and co-location, the development and implementation of basic and specialized training plans for the police, including on gender-responsive policing. The training resulted in the enrolment of the first female cadets in the gendarmerie academy and the establishment of specialized resources to assist victims of sexual and gender-based violence.

36. The protracted crisis resulted in factionalism within the military, police and gendarmerie and eroded the legitimacy of statutory security institutions. It also witnessed the emergence of other security providers, sometimes non-statutory ones, with multiple and unclear loyalties. However, UNOCI received its first security sector reform mandate only in 2011, from Security Council resolution 2000 (2011), which focused on helping the Government to elaborate a national security strategy. The mission supported the creation of the National Security Council and the development of its national strategy (adopted in 2012), which provided a nationally owned security sector framework. Its support to security sector reform was focused on preventive measures, including confidence-building initiatives, dialogue between security institutions, advice and training in "soft skills" such as human rights and child protection for security providers, and drafting of strategies and legislation in support of the parliamentary defence and security commission. In the latter stage of the mission, a stronger focus on defence sector reform led to the adoption of an important defence organization law and a military programming law for 2016–2020.

37. UNOCI benefited from a strong mandate for coordination of security sector reform, including coordination with international and bilateral partners. The mission facilitated strategic discussions with donors to pool resources, thereby ensuring the full transition of security responsibilities from UNOCI to national security forces as well as continuity of support by the United Nations country team after the mission's closure. The strong coordination led to positive outcomes, including the mission's partnership with the Peacebuilding Fund in support of the national security sector reform strategy and gender-responsive security sector reform efforts.

38. The two-year disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme that ended on 30 June 2015 was unique in that it was nationally owned: the Government financed 62 per cent of the $130 million programme and it benefited from strong political will and leadership. The programme also received financial support and technical expertise from UNOCI and factored in some of the lessons from previous failed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts that had been marred by institutional rivalries. One challenge in the new disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process was the need for more transparency with regard to the list of 65,472 ex-combatants reintegrated out of a total of 69,506 demobilized. According to 2016 data from the Ivorian authorities, at least 16,500 ex-combatants were not demobilized, and large quantities of weapons and ammunition remain unaccounted for. The 1,000 micro projects initiated by UNOCI and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Côte d'Ivoire in 2008 with funding from the Peacebuilding Fund constituted a useful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration stopgap measure to support longer-term socioeconomic reintegration. The incomplete transformation of some former combatants into a constructive force for economic development continued to challenge peacebuilding gains, however.

39. While it was anticipated that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme alone could not eradicate the circulation of small arms and light weapons,

the Government's follow-up programme on civilian disarmament also remained underfunded. The prevention of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons remained a significant challenge for the stability of the country at the time of the closure of UNOCI, taking into account the relatively high number of former combatants yet to be demobilized and repatriated.

40. The support of the United Nations Mine Action Service to national authorities for safe weapons and ammunition management has been praised as a good practice. During the mutinies, the comprehensive measures put in place prevented massive break-ins at ammunition depots and armouries, although a limited number of weapons did disappear. UNOCI, through its partnership with the Mine Action Service, enhanced the capacity of Ivorian authorities to manage safely and securely their stock of weapons and ammunition. Expired and dangerous stockpiles of ammunition were destroyed; armouries and ammunition depots across the country were rehabilitated; legislative frameworks and corresponding standards were developed; technical training on managing weapons and ammunition stores was implemented; and the organizational structure to coordinate between different entities was established. These efforts contributed to the complete lifting of the arms embargo by the Security Council in April 2016.

Electoral assistance

41. At its establishment, UNOCI was mandated to provide oversight, guidance and technical assistance to the Government of National Reconciliation, with the assistance of ECOWAS and other international partners, in order to prepare for and assist in the conduct of free, fair and transparent electoral processes linked to the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, in particular the presidential election (Security Council resolution 1528 (2004). This objective was reaffirmed in subsequent resolutions, even as the presidential elections initially planned for 2005 were postponed, until they were finally held late in 2010.

42. The Ivorian crisis had been fuelled by notions of identity, or *ivoirité*, and nationality. Expedited mobile court hearings conducted from 2006 to 2008 were the first step in the identification process for the populations in the country. The hearings focused on people born in Côte d'Ivoire without identification papers, allowing them to register to vote. The United Nations country team supported the participation of women in voter registration, which was close to reaching parity. In addition to identifying potential voters, the process also addressed the problem of the lack of identity documents. The civil registry dating to 2000 was reconstituted and a new electoral register was created in the first half of 2009. The involvement of a private company in the biometric identification process was a confidence-building measure called for by the opposition to counterbalance the involvement of State institutions, which were not perceived as impartial.

43. Among the challenges for United Nations technical electoral assistance was the lack of integration between the support provided by UNOCI and the electoral work done by UNDP, which had raised $70 million for this purpose. Part of the issue was structural: UNOCI was responsible for certification and electoral assistance and reported to the political pillar of the mission, whereas the UNDP electoral assistance programme fell under the purview of the triple-hatted Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Notwithstanding ample time for joint planning due to the election postponements, each component worked separately without integrating efforts to deliver electoral assistance as one United Nations, although information was shared. The quality of United Nations electoral assistance has been praised by Ivorian stakeholders across the political spectrum. Members of the Independent Electoral Commission however lamented the practice of the United Nations "parachuting" into the country electoral consultants who had limited understanding

of the local context, and inflexible rules and procedures that impede adequate responses to unforeseen events.

Human rights and transitional justice

44. Since its establishment within UNOCI in 2004, the Human Rights Division has monitored and reported on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and contributed to the overall protection of human rights throughout the Ivorian territory. Violations were occurring throughout the country, in particular in the west, the north and the former zone of confidence, where armed individuals and members of militia groups operated with impunity. Abductions, rapes and violence against girls and women were of particular concern. Delays in the effective redeployment of judicial services and the limited cooperation, and at times hostility, of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces, posed particular challenges to the efforts of UNOCI to prevent and address impunity and violence during the first phase of the mission.

45. Nonetheless, UNOCI informed both the public and the Security Council of human rights violations. In its regular reports, the mission denounced the persistence of politically motivated and arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, rape, confiscation of private property, and intimidation of opposition leaders and their followers. It reported violations committed, with impunity, by elements of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces, the Forces nouvelles and militias associated with both forces, as well as incidents of ethnically motivated human rights abuses such as killings, rape and destruction of dwellings, which were also committed by ethnic and community-based militias.

46. The actions of the Security Council on human rights were limited. Despite resolution 1572 (2004), in which the Council authorized sanctions on, among others, individuals responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, no individuals were listed by the Committee established pursuant to that resolution until February 2006. The report of the international commission of inquiry on serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Côte d'Ivoire, covering the period from 19 September 2002 to 16 October 2004 and transmitted to the Security Council on 23 December 2004, was not considered by the Council. This led to a discrepancy between the Council's official resolutions and presidential statements against impunity and its reluctance to take concrete actions against the perpetrators of human rights violations and the actors who encouraged them.

47. The Ouagadougou Agreement of 2007 did not explicitly address the human rights situation in Côte d'Ivoire, despite the fact that serious human rights violations were one of the root causes of the Ivorian crisis. UNOCI nonetheless continued to support the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as to monitor, investigate and report on human rights abuses committed in the country. The mission also continued to assist the Government in the formulation and implementation of a national human rights action plan, in the preparation and submission of outstanding country reports to United Nations human rights treaty bodies and in the effective functioning of the newly established National Human Rights Commission.

48. As violations became rampant during the post-electoral crisis of 2010/2011 and in the immediate aftermath, the human rights focus of the mission became investigations, including of conflict-related sexual violence and other violations allegedly committed by the Forces républicaines. The International Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council on 25 March 2011 visited the country in May of that year and concluded that serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law were committed during the 2010/2011 crisis. It further stressed that national reconciliation without justice would not be sustainable and

recommended that the Government conduct complete, impartial and transparent investigations of human rights violations and bring those responsible to justice.

49. Claims about one-sided or victor's justice in Côte d'Ivoire in the years following the post-electoral crisis pointed to the fact that national and international judicial processes focus exclusively on violations committed by Mr. Gbagbo and his supporters and have yet to hold to account perpetrators on the Forces nouvelles side. UNOCI support to the investigations of the International Criminal Court and national judicial processes had an impact on perceptions about the impartiality of the mission. There also remained throughout its deployment a reticence on the part of the Government to embrace human rights efforts, including public reporting, and a tension or conflict at times between the requirement to publicly identify and correct human rights shortcomings and the good offices efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

50. An important innovation was the establishment, during the post-electoral crisis, of a call centre for victims of sexual violence, staffed by international personnel to limit bias and preserve confidentiality. In response to Security Council resolution 1888 (2009), in 2014, UNOCI deployed an adviser on women's protection, who contributed to mainstreaming and reinforcing the capacity of the mission to address such violence in its monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements, and in its engagement with the Government. The Government showed a clear commitment to ending sexual violence and adopted several concrete measures such as a national strategy on gender-based violence and a code of conduct for Ivorian soldiers against sexual violence. Gender-based and sexual violence remained a nationwide scourge, however, and even though some initial positive steps were taken by the Government to address this problem the effects on the ground remained largely unseen. The national strategy to combat gender-based violence was adopted by the Government in 2014, but an independent assessment commissioned by the United Nations country team showed an insufficient level of implementation of the strategy.

51. An interesting initiative supported by UNOCI was a joint mechanism bringing together the Forces républicaines, the National Human Rights Commission and the human rights and police components of UNOCI, which helped to ensure accountability for human rights violations by elements of the national armed forces. They met on a monthly basis, including in the field offices, to review allegations of human rights violations and determine appropriate action. By facilitating direct discussions with the Government, the mechanism helped to reduce the number of cases of violations, including sexual violence, attributed to the Forces républicaines, which, in 2017, were delisted as a party to conflict from the annex to the Secretary-General's report on conflict-related sexual violence, after being added in January 2012.

52. A main priority for UNOCI was supporting the national human rights organ, the National Human Rights Commission, to ensure that it would have the requisite capacity to perform key human rights protection and promotion functions after the closure of UNOCI. Although the Commission adopted a four-year strategic document, building on the assessment and recommendations of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions, by the time UNOCI ceased its human rights work, shortcomings remained with respect to the Commission's independence and institutional capacity, as well as logistical challenges, and actions required to align it with the Paris Principles, a set of international standards which frame and guide the work of national human rights institutions.

53. On transitional justice, UNOCI assisted the Government with the creation of the Commission dialogue, vérité et réconciliation in 2011 and the Commission nationale pour la réconciliation et l'indemnisation des victimes des crises survenues en Côte

d'Ivoire in 2015. It provided technical advice, with support from the Peacebuilding Fund and other partners. Early in August 2018, President Ouattara announced amnesties, in the name of national reconciliation, for around 800 people prosecuted or sentenced for offences related to the post-electoral crisis or State security offences committed after 21 May 2011, including the former First Lady, Simone Gbagbo. However, inequalities, land conflicts and the existence of a disgruntled opposition, composed mainly of pro-Gbagbo supporters who accuse the Government of promoting victor's justice and ethnic privileges and arbitrarily detaining opposition supporters, are other destabilizing factors that may hinder a durable peace. In addition, reconciliation and transitional justice processes relating to the violence and the conflict of the past have yet to be fully implemented. While the Commission dialogue, vérité et réconciliation finalized its report in December 2014, the report was never made public and the public hearings held were never broadcast, weakening any potential impact of the process.

Social cohesion and community-level dialogue

54. During the final period of its deployment, UNOCI prioritized efforts to prevent local conflicts and promote reconciliation and social cohesion through local mediation. The shift towards local-level reconciliation and social cohesion followed a stalled national reconciliation and came amid continuing intercommunal violence. Strategically, these prevention initiatives were directly linked to the good offices and political mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Aïchatou Mindaoudou. The mediation activities and intercommunal dialogues were means to address some of the social and intercommunal tensions exacerbated by the Ivorian crisis such as displacement and the resulting conflicts over land. From 2013 to 2017, the mission, together with the United Nations country team and other partners, organized some 100 intercommunal dialogues at the regional and local levels, helping communities to identify and sustain prevention and resolution initiatives among themselves. The presence of UNOCI civilian staff, including national staff and women, in field offices throughout the country, and the active engagement of mission leadership were key to these prevention efforts.

55. On the basis of an analysis of local mediation and intercommunal dialogue initiatives, UNOCI also identified small-scale projects that could help to unite communities. Approximately 1,025 quick-impact projects focused on national reconciliation and social cohesion were implemented over the lifespan of UNOCI. They supported the renovation of health centres, schools, sport facilities, administrative buildings, and infrastructure for tradesmen, traditional and religious authorities, and women's and youth groups. They were important for strengthening local peacebuilding mechanisms and building trust among Ivorians, according to interviews with local stakeholders by the assessment team for this lessons-learned exercise. Although short-term and limited in scale, such projects facilitated peaceful coexistence by providing an essential first step to social cohesion. Activities funded by quick-impact projects on cohesion and cross-border issues were among the most effective contributions made by UNOCI to local mediation processes.

Strategic communication

56. In June 2004, the ONUCI FM radio station was established and filled a gap in information, especially outside Abidjan. Throughout its existence, ONUCI FM provided impartial news, informing the public about the peace process and other developments, promoting peace and reconciliation, and organizing political debates. The radio station broadcast 24 hours a day, seven days a week, for more than 13 years, reaching approximately 76 per cent of the country, with programming in French and five major Ivorian languages. While the radio was particularly useful in the run-up to

the elections and during the electoral crisis, it also greatly contributed to preserving stability in the post-election phase, and to promoting the work of UNOCI across all of its components.

57. With the closure of UNOCI on the horizon, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire requested that it retain ONUCI FM, which has become the Radio de la paix, and is operated by the Félix Houphouët-Boigny Foundation for Peace in the context of its partnership with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on the culture of peace. A memorandum of understanding concluded with the Government stipulates that the latter is responsible for covering the costs of operation, and that equal access by all segments of Ivorian society, impartiality and editorial independence should be guaranteed. An important lesson from the handover of the radio station of the mission was that continuity is important, and it was preserved in this example by the decision of the Government to hire former ONUCI FM personnel, including on-air personalities.

VI. Embargo and sanctions regime

58. The arms embargo was imposed on Côte d'Ivoire late in 2004, in response to Government attacks on UNOCI. The Security Council by resolution 1572 (2004) imposed an immediate arms embargo on Côte d'Ivoire and placed travel restrictions on individuals involved in the conflict and froze their assets. The Council also established a sanctions Committee to oversee the implementation of the resolution. By resolution 1584 (2005) the Council subsequently authorized UNOCI and Operation Licorne to monitor the arms embargo and requested that the Secretary-General establish a Group of Experts to monitor the arms embargo. At the end of 2005, the mandate to monitor the production and illicit export of rough diamonds was added under resolution 1643 (2005).

59. A good practice and innovation was the establishment, as advised by the Group of Experts, of an embargo cell within the structure of UNOCI, which reported to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) through the Department of Political Affairs. This integrated cell was initially established in 2005 with four civilian personnel, two military officers and two United Nations police officers. Its mandate was to provide substantive and logistical support for the work of the Group of Experts. The cell was located in different sections of the mission until 2008, when it became a stand-alone cell responding directly to mission leadership. It contributed to reinforcing the capacities of the Group of Experts with collection, analysis and the institutional memory such groups often lack. It also supported UNOCI in fulfilling its mandate to monitor the embargo, by formulating guidelines for mission sections for this purpose.

60. The creation of the embargo cell resulted in a tangible improvement in the methodology, quality and number of inspections carried out by the mission and the creation of databases, as well as in better coordination between the mission and the Group of Experts (see S/2006/964). It also helped in liaising with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme as well as with Operation Licorne on monitoring and enforcement. The cell also helped to advise the UNOCI leadership on issues such as organized crime and trafficking. The cell required specialized staff, however, as consultants were required to cover gaps in areas such as customs, as well as dedicated funding. There was also a need to improve confidentiality in the context of information management within the peacekeeping operation.

61. The sanctions regime involved an element of media monitoring. During the violence of late 2004, some Ivorian media outlets were directly targeted by the Young Patriots, transmitters of foreign radio stations were sabotaged, and there was a

demonstrable, disconcerting upsurge in language hostile to foreigners and the United Nations in the media. By its resolution 1572 (2004), the Security Council demanded that the Ivorian authorities stop all radio and television broadcasts inciting hatred, intolerance and violence, and requested UNOCI to strengthen its monitoring of local media. By resolution 1739 (2007) the Council expanded the public information mandate of UNOCI to include the monitoring of Ivorian mass media, in particular with regard to any incidents of incitement by the media to hatred, intolerance and violence, and to keep the Committee regularly informed of the situation in this regard.

62. Tasking UNOCI to report to the sanctions Committee on its media monitoring, as well as its human rights monitoring, was a particular innovation at the time and it has since been replicated in other peacekeeping contexts. UNOCI also supported the Ministry of Communication in establishing an early warning unit on hate media that included representatives of the Government, media regulatory bodies, the national journalists' association and UNOCI, and strengthened its collaboration with media regulatory bodies (see S/2007/133).

Impact of sanctions

63. Although an arms embargo is an important tool that can complement peacekeeping, its impact on actual arms transfers was mixed in Côte d'Ivoire, for several reasons. In one report, the Group of Experts stated that despite its best effort and the above-mentioned embargo cell, it was of the view that neither the modus operandi established by the impartial forces and the Ivorian parties, nor the instruments available to UNOCI and Operation Licorne for the monitoring of the implementation of the embargo on supplies of arms and related materiel, were very effective (see S/2007/611). The first set of challenges related to the limited access the Group of Experts had in the south, which was controlled by a defiant host Government, or in the north, which was controlled by Forces nouvelles rebels. Inspections at airports, seaports, military bases, border crossings and diamond mines were almost systematically refused, even though the Security Council had clearly stated that UNOCI should be able to carry them out anywhere without prior notification.

64. The second set of challenges related to the limited cooperation of neighbouring States, which made it almost impossible to monitor transfers of small arms and light weapons. The Group of Experts reported that, despite the arms embargo, the Ivorian parties in both the north and the south were able to rearm and re-equip themselves (see S/2009/521). That said, the sanctions regime may have proved useful in preventing the entry of heavy weapons such as attack helicopters, which are more difficult to conceal and easier to trace than small arms and light weapons. In the case of defiant parties and uncooperative neighbours, stronger pressure from the Security Council might help to render a sanctions regime more effective.

65. "Smart sanctions" also had a limited impact in Côte d'Ivoire, as they were difficult to implement. Sanctions targeting individuals were more effective, particularly when dealing with members of an elite political class that owned assets abroad, even though it did not stop them from travelling to countries that failed to comply with the sanctions regime. The combined effect of sanctions, including the freezing of assets by the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and the Central Bank of West African States, progressively constrained Mr. Gbagbo's ability to pay his defence and security forces and civil servants, and may have had some influence on his entourage. However, the sanctions were not decisive during the post-electoral crisis. Rather, Mr. Gbagbo continued to generate revenue by taxing the Abidjan port and nationalizing the cocoa and coffee industries, in addition to receiving funds from supportive Governments.

66. The democratically elected Government sought the lifting of the embargo shortly after the post-electoral crisis ended in 2011 but the process unfolded gradually. The sanctions were a tool for the Security Council to encourage progress on an action plan for the Kimberley Process and to set up an internal control system for trade in rough diamonds, and to encourage progress on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform, national reconciliation and the fight against impunity. Moreover, given that the Forces républicaines initially had serious fragilities, including in terms of weapons management, the gradual lifting of the arms embargo had an important structural effect in that exemptions granted for equipping certain units had to be requested in a coordinated manner by the National Security Council.

67. The Security Council lifted all sanctions on Côte d'Ivoire in April 2016, just before deciding to terminate the mandate of UNOCI, but serious challenges remained unaddressed. In its final report (S/2016/254), the Group of Experts had documented the acquisition, in violation of the arms embargo, of some 300 tons of materiel by former elements of the Forces nouvelles after the post-electoral crisis, warned about the dysfunctional condition of the Ivorian security forces, and expressed concerns about border control operations and customs administration, cross-border movements of natural resources and persons and diamond smuggling.

VII. Transformation of the United Nations engagement

68. The transition planning process in Côte d'Ivoire was initiated after the Security Council, in its resolution 2062 (2012), requested that the Secretary-General prepare benchmarks for transition planning and provide recommendations for possible adjustments to the structure and strength of UNOCI. In 2013, UNOCI worked closely with the Government and the United Nations country team on two strategic transition-related processes, namely, a comparative advantage exercise and a benchmarking exercise with timelines for handing over the mission's mandated tasks. Those processes revealed that the country team lacked the personnel and financial resources to assume additional responsibilities from the peacekeeping operation, leading to the risk that critical tasks would be discontinued after the closure of the mission.

69. The transition planning process gathered further momentum in 2015, following the peaceful presidential election and the Council's subsequent requests in its resolutions 2226 (2015) and 2260 (2016) for proposals on the possible termination of UNOCI on the basis of the improvement of security conditions on the ground and the national capacity to assume the mission's security role. That year, UNOCI developed an internal transition plan focusing on staff drawdown and how to prioritize mandate implementation. The Security Council began the gradual closure of UNOCI as the Government was restoring the country's position as a regional leader amid a backdrop of considerable economic growth.

70. The requested recommendations to close UNOCI were based on a multidisciplinary strategic review led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and were set out in a special report of the Secretary-General (S/2016/297). No United Nations successor mission was seriously considered, owing primarily to the position of the Government and given the country's relatively strong national institutions. Although recommended, no stand-alone human rights office was established within the country team. The Government considered that it was not necessary. Building on a lesson learned from UNMIL, it was also recommended that UNOCI should hand over security responsibilities to the Ivorian authorities while still deployed in the country, with a mandate to protect civilians in extremis. By its resolution 2284 (2016), the Security Council extended the mission's mandate for a final period until 30 June

2017, and decided that from 1 May to 30 June 2017 the mandate would be to complete the mission's closure and to finalize the transition process to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations country team.

71. As the security situation in the country began to improve following the post-electoral crisis in 2011, the mandate and posture of UNOCI underwent several reviews and downward adjustments. Subsequent exercises to develop and refine strategic benchmarks as well as to carry out a civilian staffing review ensured that UNOCI tracked strategic priorities and that civilian staffing structures and capacities allowed the mission to respond effectively to residual challenges until the electoral cycle of 2015 and beyond. The gradual drawdown of the mission as well as the timing of its closure in June 2017, which ensured a security presence throughout the presidential and legislative elections in 2015 and 2016 to address any potential tensions, should be seen as best practice that can inform future transitions elsewhere.

Implementing the transition

72. The cost of the final transition plan resulting from the mission's closure was estimated at some $500 million, $50 million of which was expected to be covered by the United Nations country team. A diversified resource mobilization approach was adopted that also included $3 million of assessed contributions to UNOCI. Owing to the bureaucratic processes involved and the late approval of the budget by the General Assembly in December 2016, however, the project implementation period was significantly condensed and the catalytic and strategic value of the funds reallocated from UNOCI to the country team was limited. The Peacebuilding Fund committed $5 million on the understanding that the Government would match those funds with $10 million in support of residual activities over 18 months. The commitment by the Government to peacebuilding was an important signal but the pledged funds have yet to be transferred.

73. Bilateral donors committed $8.5 million of voluntary contributions. Higher donor commitment did not materialize for a number of reasons, including the perception that the plan was a fundraising tool for the United Nations country team rather than for Côte d'Ivoire. Some donors also indicated the need for longer lead times for committing funds. More fundamentally, however, and due to the fact that Côte d'Ivoire has made great strides since 2011, donors either disengaged from the country or focused on transitional socioeconomic development initiatives instead of residual governance and security challenges. Overall, the United Nations country team managed to mobilize $25 million of the required $50 million to support the consolidation of peacebuilding gains. While this is a significant shortfall, it still compares favourably to other recent transition processes and illustrates the difficulty of maintaining political and financial engagement beyond mission withdrawal.

Liquidation

74. UNOCI was in existence for 13 years and was present at 64 locations throughout the country. In addition to its sizeable footprint, at the point of downsizing its operations in preparation for liquidation, the mission was supporting 3,500 uniformed personnel with nearly 18,000 assets, all of which made the start of liquidation planning and the closure of the mission proper a challenge of immense proportions. Prior to the official transition and liquidation period, UNOCI commenced a drawdown of civilian staff as early as October 2015 and February 2016. On 28 April 2016, the Security Council by resolution 2284 (2016) determined that UNOCI was to be operational until 30 April 2017 and complete its full closure and liquidation by 30 June 2017. These were mutually exclusive deadlines, as the liquidation of a peacekeeping mission of this size, with due regard to the processes of the Organization and its rules and regulations, could not have been achieved in 60 days.

75. In order to achieve the deadline of 30 June 2017 for the completion of liquidation, UNOCI and the Secretariat agreed that substantive activities in the sectors would cease by the end of December 2016. This would allow UNOCI to complete the early drawdown of uniformed personnel by 15 February 2017 and the phased reductions in substantive activities by 30 April 2017. This strategy was based on an analysis conducted by the mission on "best case" lead times for major liquidation activities and the timelines within the mission support operations transition, and on the liquidation plan drafted in August 2016 and amended in March 2017.

76. UNOCI repatriated, redeployed or separated 5,585 staff, including international and national staff, United Nations Volunteers, military observers, military contingents, United Nations police and formed police units. By 30 June 2017, the mission successfully completed its liquidation and closed. All premises were handed back, designated assets were disposed of and records were archived.

77. Towards the end of the liquidation process, to avoid distorting the Ivorian economy and to generate some revenue, UNOCI sold functioning equipment that was not transferred to other peacekeeping missions on the local market, in accordance with United Nations procedures. Initially, equipment that was not sold was destroyed, a process that was discontinued once it was clear that this had a negative impact on the mission's image. The equipment that remained to be transferred to the United Nations country team or the Government and its partners was limited and nearing the end of its useful life. The handover process was conducted over the course of one week, leaving little time for United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to plan. The handing-over of vehicles to the Government and non-governmental organizations posed significant challenges in terms of unforeseen additional costs for customs clearance, number plates and repair.

78. An additional lesson from UNOCI is that the human rights due diligence policy applies to the handover of equipment to national defence and security institutions in the context of mission liquidation, a procedure the mission carefully followed but which frustrated Ivorian counterparts. A good practice was the involvement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and substantive staff in the screening of local actors to ensure that the handover of tasks did not fuel conflicts. Another good practice was factoring in environmental sustainability, including through systematic soil decontamination, before returning UNOCI sites to their owners.

Sustaining engagement

79. After the closure of UNOCI, the responsibility for sustaining United Nations engagement in Côte d'Ivoire rests with the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team, who rely on voluntary contributions. A positive precedent was the retention of the triple-hatted Deputy Special Representative as the Resident Coordinator, at the level of Assistant Secretary-General, to facilitate the transition and provide senior leadership continuity. There were however no complementary enhancements of the Office of the Resident Coordinator, limiting the important convening role of the United Nations.

80. An important lesson is that the Resident Coordinator must be fully empowered with the requisite capacities, authority and resources to ensure that the United Nations country team is able to continue relevant peacebuilding activities after the closure of a peacekeeping mission. The absence of a mechanism to ensure the deployment of a peace and development adviser or a human rights adviser led to extensive delays in enabling the Resident Coordinator with such capacity. The Peacebuilding Fund has funded a transition and peacebuilding adviser since January 2018. A country-specific pooled fund for the transition could have empowered the Resident Coordinator and the country team, while improving integration and reassuring donors. Côte d'Ivoire

was added to the agenda of the Secretary-General's Executive Committee, under the item on transitions, in 2017 and remains under review. After the closure of UNOCI and the transfer of lead responsibilities within the Secretariat from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Department of Political Affairs, a task force co-chaired by the Department of Political Affairs and UNDP was established, linking Headquarters in New York, the Resident Coordinator in Abidjan and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel in Dakar.

VIII. Conclusions and reflections

81. I assumed my responsibilities as Secretary-General in January 2017, at a period when the imminent closure of UNOCI, one of our peacekeeping success stories in West Africa, helped to shape the context in which the United Nations was adjusting its peacekeeping footprint in the subregion. The review of the 13-year experience of UNOCI, including its challenges and successes, is an important endeavour especially in view of my efforts to reform the peace and security architecture of the United Nations, and to enhance the political effectiveness and operational performance of peacekeeping operations. I therefore welcome the opportunity provided by the Security Council in the statement by its President dated 30 June 2017 (S/PRST/2017/8), in which it requested me to provide a comprehensive study of the role of UNOCI in settling the situation in Côte d'Ivoire.

82. As emphasized in the present report, the Ivorian experience highlights some significant lessons, which pertain to the primacy of politics, the performance of United Nations peacekeeping operations at strategic and operational levels, sustainable partnerships with a wide array of stakeholders, close ties with the host Government and nation, and the need to embark as early as possible on a path focused on peacebuilding and sustaining peace. This study provides a welcome opportunity to extract constructive lessons which could inform our ongoing efforts to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping, in the context of the Action for Peacekeeping agenda that I presented to Member States in March 2018.

83. In my ongoing efforts to reform the peace and security architecture of the United Nations, and to enhance the political effectiveness and operational performance of our peacekeeping operations, revisiting the complex trajectory of UNOCI and the many challenges and successes it encountered throughout its 13 years of existence was for me an important endeavour that I am pleased to present to the Security Council in this report.

84. Early in 2004, when Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended to the Security Council the deployment of UNOCI, Côte d'Ivoire was divided between the north and the south by a militarily enforced zone of confidence and was mired in a complex and volatile political and social ecosystem. Moving from that turmoil to the promising prospects of political and national reconciliation, combined with impressive socioeconomic progress since the aftermath of the 2010/2011 post-electoral crisis, has been the result of a combination of factors, at the global, regional, national and local levels. This confluence of factors is well captured in this study and can be presented as a "success story" amidst a generally grim environment of protracted conflicts and peace to keep in many parts of the world.

85. The signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, in January 2003, under the auspices of the Government of France and the joint facilitation of ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations, paved the way for the deployment of an African-led peace operation, weeks later, alongside a United Nations political mission, MINUCI. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement offered an inclusive foundation for a political framework for the stabilization of the country. It was followed by

several other agreements, including those signed in Accra in 2004, Pretoria in 2005, and then Ouagadougou in 2007. The peace process launched by those agreements was further sustained by the engagement of the subregion, the African Union, the United Nations and Ivorian stakeholders.

86. The Ivorian experience demonstrated that, when political strategies pursued by peacekeeping operations are supported by a united and cohesive international community and the good offices of the Special Representatives, they stand a better chance of achieving results that are consistent with the priorities set out in the peace agreements. The 2010 post-electoral crisis brought the international community to the brink of a divide over the need to uphold the results of the presidential elections as certified by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The unity of purpose displayed by regional and international partners with regard to the deployment of UNOCI contributed to creating a more conducive environment and better acceptance by the host Government of the peacekeeping operation.

87. The Ivorian experience has also demonstrated that, when peacekeeping operations are given clear mandates by the Security Council, supported by regional and continental stakeholders and adequately resourced, they can be successful and can lead to a swift exit strategy. By all accounts, the presidential election of 2010 triggered a major turning point for UNOCI. Its management of the ensuing post-electoral crisis ultimately set the mission on a path to a successful completion of its mandate. UNOCI positively influenced the course of Ivorian history by upholding the results of democratically held presidential elections through its certification mandate, by engaging politically at the field and capital levels, and by taking robust security action on the ground together with the French force Operation Licorne to protect civilians and restore democratic order.

88. Furthermore, leadership constitutes an essential factor, and peacekeeping operations can better fulfil their mandated objectives in contexts where the host Government is a responsible partner and has an unwavering commitment to delivering on its responsibilities to the citizens it serves. No peacekeeping operation can substitute for national political will or national efforts to overcome the root causes of conflict. In the final six years of the deployment of UNOCI, significant progress was made on all fronts in Côte d'Ivoire. At the same time, a united mission leadership team, backed by a coherent political strategy, was essential to effectively manage crisis and to accompany needed reforms. While this was not always the case throughout the multiple lives of UNOCI, the Ivorian experience overall has confirmed that maintaining a cohesive leadership is a critical success factor for United Nations peacekeeping operations. Such leadership also positively influenced relations with the host Government, as seen in the final years of the mission's life.

89. Another significant lesson drawn from the Ivorian experience is that maintaining open channels of communication with the parties and conducting joint operations in their respective areas of responsibility, as well as outreach to civil society actors, can serve to prevent, inter alia, violent demonstrations or ceasefire violations.

90. The trajectory of the relationship between UNOCI and the Ivorian authorities has illustrated the fact that the consent of the host country is rarely absolute or constant. It has the potential to erode or evolve over time and remains inextricably linked to perceptions about a mission's mandate, role and responsibilities. In the Ivorian context, the certification of all stages of the electoral process with which the Special Representative was entrusted to some extent contributed to a strained relationship between former President Gbagbo and the United Nations.

91. In a period prior to the departure of UNOCI, several political and security reforms and reconciliation and transitional justice processes were delayed. In many

instances, the mission's leadership also found it difficult to raise contentious issues, including the urgently needed reform of the security sector, with the country's leadership. The mutinies staged early in 2017 by elements of the Forces armées (formerly Forces républicaines) de Côte d'Ivoire attest to the complex challenges that remain incompletely addressed ahead of the presidential elections of 2020. A key lesson to note from the Ivorian context is that a mission should endeavour to anticipate and prepare to mitigate the possible withdrawal of a host country's consent. The issue of consent should be managed from the start of the mission, both at the level of the mission leadership and at the Secretariat level. The Security Council should also be actively involved in support of peacekeeping missions as a host Government's consent changes.

92. Peacekeeping operations, in particular their leadership, ought to be more accountable and fit for purpose in order to sustain their legitimacy, the confidence of the host nations and Governments, and the continuing support of regional and international stakeholders, including the Security Council. It is in that spirit that, learning from the experience of several peace operations, including UNOCI, I decided to undertake independent reviews of several United Nations peace operations over the course of 2018. I am committed to keeping peacekeeping operations under regular review to ensure that they are delivering on priority tasks in accordance with the mandates given by the Security Council.

93. In the case of UNOCI, the Secretariat dispatched more than a dozen strategic assessment teams to Côte d'Ivoire over its lifespan. These assessments informed recommendations to the Security Council on the appropriateness of the mandate and posture of the mission. In addition, the Secretariat had a multi-year strategy for the transition and eventual withdrawal of UNOCI. The strategy was linked to UNMIL in order to have a regional approach to crises in the West African region. Furthermore, as members of the Security Council will recall, upon the completion of the UNOCI mandate, my predecessor, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, recommended the transfer of the Senegalese-manned regional quick reaction force, which was operating out of Côte d'Ivoire, to MINUSMA.

94. The Ivorian experience further served as a laboratory for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The mission had a sound and clear articulation of political strategies and use of force, especially in the context of the post-electoral crisis to enforce the verdict of the certification of the election results. The security strategy pursued by UNOCI combined a robust deterrent posture, particularly against armed groups and self-defence militias threatening civilians in the areas of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The deployment of UNOCI alongside an international force, the French Operation Licorne, also played an important role in helping the mission to fulfil its security obligations. Furthermore, with the adoption of resolution 1609 (2005), the Security Council stipulated guidelines that for the first time allowed peace operations in West Africa to support each other through the time-bound deployment of surge capacities in the form of uniformed personnel and other assets. As mentioned earlier in this report, during the post-electoral crisis in 2010/2011 some UNMIL troops and police elements were deployed to Côte d'Ivoire in support of an overstretched military component of UNOCI. However, while I am in favour of this experiment, including ways to ensure that redeployed troops and police elements are adequately sustained by the receiving mission, inter-mission cooperation cannot be a substitute for efforts to endow missions with adequate capabilities.

95. As emphasized in my presentation on the Action for Peacekeeping initiative to the Security Council on 28 March, I remain convinced that it is essential to prioritize the improvement of the performance of troops and police. This can be facilitated by memoranda of understanding with contributing countries that go beyond logistics to include the outcome expected from the unit in a specific context. The same lesson

would apply to the quick reaction force, which was among the last of the UNOCI troops to be repatriated as the mission closed, prior to its transfer to MINUSMA. That well-equipped and well-trained unit played the role of enabler by providing security coverage for the civilian work of the mission. There was however over-reliance on such units to perform routine duties and substitute for underperforming contingents when national actors were already increasingly assuming responsibility for the stability of the country and the protection of civilians.

96. It is equally important to emphasize the effective support of the United Nations to institution-building, primarily in the areas of rule of law and security institutions. Security transitions and exit strategies conducted prior to the departure of UNOCI from Côte d'Ivoire and the departure of UNMIL from Liberia have reconfirmed the necessity of gradually adjusting the military footprint and posture of United Nations peace operations in response to changing circumstances on the ground, including the evolution of the responsibility and capabilities of national security institutions. In the experience of UNOCI, engaging from the early stages in the elaboration of the national security sector reform strategy, immediately after the end of the 2011 post-electoral crisis, allowed the mission to adequately factor in the nexus between disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform in Government-led strategies. The implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme remains incomplete to date, however. It has shown that sustaining gains achieved with the support of the peacekeeping operation require continuing and considerable efforts from the Government and its partners long after the closure of UNOCI.

97. Closely linked in a way to the incomplete reform of the rule of law security institutions, the unrest witnessed in several garrisons early in 2017 attested to the fragile republican and democratic nature of the Ivorian security institutions. The unrest also further fuelled the overall perception of a "victor's justice" system that prevailed until the departure of UNOCI at the end of June 2017.

98. The reconciliatory gestures made by President Ouattara in recent weeks are commendable. At the same time, I wish to underline that measures of political amnesty and pardon should be accompanied by a robust accountability mechanism to address long-standing demands by Ivorian civil society and citizens for the prosecution of members of the Forces nouvelles, now integrated within the Forces armées de Côte d'Ivoire, who were involved in grave human rights violations in the context of the post-electoral crisis of 2010/2011.

99. On the one hand, I applaud my last Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire, Aïchatou Mindaoudou, for her tireless efforts — through good offices — in fostering local political dialogue and reconciliation and in supporting the national strategy for reconciliation and social cohesion. On the other hand, the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General can be sustained in the long run only through a comprehensive and inclusive reconciliation strategy that places human rights principles and obligations in the forefront and that provides for an effective transitional justice strategy. An important consideration that emerges from the experience in Côte d'Ivoire is the need for continuing encouragement to a host Government to remain open to human rights interventions, even as the situation in the country stabilizes and the Government increasingly asserts its responsibilities. For many observers, the human rights efforts of the United Nations in Côte d'Ivoire concluded prematurely, given the fragility of national human rights institutions. Although the Government was not willing to consider the establishment of a stand-alone human rights office within the United Nations country team after the closure of UNOCI, the continuing engagement of an independent human rights expert could have played a useful role in advising the Ivorian authorities as they build stronger human rights and transitional justice mechanisms.

100. With regard to peacebuilding, President Ouattara played a proactive role in fostering a transformative agenda for his country, in which the United Nations own transition plan and transfer of residual tasks and responsibilities was anchored. A good practice in that regard was the joint planning involving UNOCI, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, the United Nations country team and international partners. That exercise sought to develop a transition plan focused on consolidating the achievements of the mission and reaching a common understanding among responsible entities of the residual challenges and priorities. The final transition plan outlined the outcomes of the consultative process, and was formally signed by UNOCI, the Government and its partners on 17 October 2016. The residual challenges identified in the transition plan were further mainstreamed into the national development programme for the period from 2016 to 2020 and into the peacebuilding support programme. In addition, the United Nations system identified the need for truly integrated transition planning earlier in the UNOCI drawdown planning process and successfully proposed that the triple-hatted Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, under the strategic guidance of the Special Representative, should assume a leadership role with respect to the technical aspects of transition planning beyond the closure of the mission. This transition model has, since then, been replicated in Liberia, which benefited from the participation of a broader range of national stakeholders, including civil society.

101. Just over a year after the closure of UNOCI, Côte d'Ivoire remains on the path to enduring peace and stability, as well as economic prosperity. Instead of being on the agenda of the Security Council, Côte d'Ivoire is serving the first year of a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the Council. Rather than hosting a peacekeeping operation, Côte d'Ivoire is contributing peacekeepers to MINUSMA. However, in an environment where terrorism and violent extremism have significantly tested the resilience of West African nations, preserving the hard-won peace dividends gained by the Ivorian people and Government on the path to stability should remain our primary goal.

102. In this context, I welcome the continuing, determined efforts of the people and Government of Côte d'Ivoire to address the root causes of the Ivorian crisis, which continue to contribute to the fragility of the nation. Ultimately, their resolve will shape the stability of Côte d'Ivoire. Political dialogue, security reforms, national reconciliation, social cohesion, promotion of human rights, and reduction of socioeconomic inequalities must be at the heart of their efforts. In this regard, the development reform under way and the new profile attached to the role of United Nations Resident Coordinator will contribute to addressing, hand in hand with the people and Government of Côte d'Ivoire, existing sources of fragility.

103. I wish to commend the tireless efforts of the Resident Coordinator for Côte d'Ivoire, Babacar Cissé, and my Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel, Mohammed Ibn Chambas. Both have been actively engaged in supporting the path to sustainable peace since the closure of UNOCI in June 2017.

104. My deep gratitude also goes to all the civilian and uniformed personnel who served with UNOCI over the course of its deployment, as well as their families. I pay a particular tribute to the peacekeepers who lost their lives in pursuit of peace in Côte d'Ivoire. I also wish to express appreciation to all those appointed in the senior leadership who served in UNOCI since its establishment, including my last Special Representative, Aïchatou Mindaoudou. Ms. Mindaoudou and her predecessors, Albert Gerard (Bert) Koenders, Young-Jin Choi, Pierre Schori and Albert Tévoédjrè, and the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa, Said Djinnit, who helped to bring the mandate of UNOCI to a successful conclusion.

105. My appreciation also goes to the countries that contributed troops and police to UNOCI. I wish to recognize in particular the role of ECOWAS, whose green helmets paved the way for UNOCI, the parallel French forces, the African Union, the Mano River Union, the European Union, and other regional organizations, multilateral and bilateral partners, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, non-governmental organizations and all other partners for their invaluable contributions.

106. I also wish to express my appreciation to the people and Government of Côte d'Ivoire, who were the decisive factor in overcoming the crisis and whose continuing, determined efforts are sustaining the peace.

107. Finally, I wish to commend the leadership of my predecessors, Secretaries-General Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon, and the members of the Security Council, who, in their respective capacities, have continuously extended the required leadership and attention to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and its potential impact across West Africa.

United Nations S/2018/959

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 October 2018

Original: English

Credentials of the alternate representatives of Côte d'Ivoire on the Security Council

Report of the Secretary-General

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 26 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire stating that Mr. Check Ibrahim Bakayoko and Mr. Isaac Bile-Hamilton have been appointed alternate representatives of Côte d'Ivoire on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

18-17979 (E) 301018

Please recycle

United Nations S/2018/960

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 October 2018

Original: English

Identical letters dated 26 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write to bring to your attention alarming information regarding Hezbollah's missile conversion activities in Beirut, elaborating on the information provided by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September 2018.

The Prime Minister revealed no less than three secret Hezbollah precision missile conversion sites near and adjacent to Beirut's international airport. The existence of these sites alone is sufficient to constitute a violation of Security Council resolutions and international norms.

Every country with citizens landing in Beirut's international airport should be horrified by the dangers Hezbollah has posed and should condemn its heinous disregard for international aviation safety laws. Moreover, countries should demand an explanation from the Lebanese civil aviation authority, the city of Beirut and the Government of Lebanon, and a guarantee of the safety of the passengers. Simply put, every country that does not speak up against Hezbollah is endangering its citizens.

Hezbollah has intentionally placed its missile conversion sites amid mass civilian population centers in Beirut, using them as human shields for its malicious military activities. Hezbollah has positioned these missiles underneath and beside a football stadium. These reckless actions are explosive and clearly contradict Security Council resolutions and international norms.

Hezbollah's tactics on and off the football field reflect an outrageous violation and mockery of the people of Beirut. Their safety, however, is the responsibility of Tamim Sleiman, Chair of the Al-Ahed Sports Club, which is truly "Team Hezbollah". Hezbollah's illegal activities must also be acknowledged by the sponsors of the team, including MTC TOUCH, Lebanon's largest cellular network, and Fourteen, the European sports equipment company.

Given the reality on the ground, there is no way for an international or a Lebanese company to ensure that its facilities are not placed beside or above a missile conversion site or have not been exploited by Hezbollah. The Lebanese authorities must conduct the necessary due diligence to ensure that facilities and funding are not being used for Hezbollah's terrorist activities. It is the clear duty of the Lebanese Football Association, the Lebanese Ministry of Sports, and most importantly, the Government of Lebanon, to ensure the safety of football fans, players and staff.

Please recycle

The last report of the Secretary-General on Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) shows, once again, that the international community has yet to address the threat posed by Hezbollah to Lebanon, and instead turns a blind eye to the Lebanese authorities, as they lack the willingness to exercise their ultimate responsibility to ensure the monopoly of the use of force. The Secretary-General has elaborated on this issue, stating that he notes "with concern the claim by Hassan Nasrallah that Hizbullah possesses precision weapons". Based on the evidence that is piling up against Hezbollah for its abuse of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure to store and manufacture weaponry, the Security Council should implement its resolutions: condemn Hezbollah, the terrorist organization, vigorously and demand its demilitarization. Every minute of inaction breathes life into Hezbollah's deadly terrorist ambitions.

Israel reserves the right to protect its citizens from the growing threat of Hezbollah and will not tolerate Hezbollah's use of Lebanon as a launching pad for attacks that threaten the lives of innocent Israelis.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2018/961

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 October 2018

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Expressing grave concern about the most recent outbreak of the Ebola virus in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the fact that this epidemic is occurring in the context of much wider humanitarian needs, in a country whose people have suffered from the recurrence of the disease, armed conflict and violence for the last few decades,

Recognizing the recurring threat of the Ebola virus in the region since it was first discovered in 1976 and *recalling* its Resolution 2177 (2014) concerning the 2014 Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa,

Recalling its determination in resolution 2409 (2018) that the situation in the DRC continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, and *expressing* concern that this security situation negatively impacts the ability to respond to and contain the outbreak of the Ebola virus,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the DRC and all States in the region, and emphasizing the need for cooperation and coordination with the DRC to address the Ebola situation, as well as with the States in the region, as appropriate,

Noting the reports presented to the Security Council on 28 August and on 3 October 2018 by the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO),

Commending the Government of the DRC for its leadership in responding to the Ebola outbreak, particularly for providing free health care in affected health zones, as well as for its daily reporting on the status of the outbreak,

Expressing appreciation for the efforts of all humanitarian and health workers on the ground, including the WHO and its partners in the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, as well as all other front-line actors involved in the response effort,

Commending the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) for providing support to the efforts of the government of the DRC, the WHO and other actors to respond to the Ebola outbreak in an extremely challenging and dangerous environment,

Underscoring the need to address the security situation in the areas affected by the disease and condemning all attacks against civilians,

Please recycle

Expressing outrage and *condemning* in the strongest terms the recent attacks and the killings of two Congolese health workers attached to a Congolese army unit helping to combat the Ebola outbreak in the DRC,

Recalling resolution 2286 (2016) and urging all parties to the armed conflict to ensure full, safe, immediate and unhindered access for humanitarian personnel and medical personnel, to patients and others in need; condemning acts of violence, attacks and threats intentionally directed against medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities, exclusively fulfilling a medical or humanitarian function, as a violation of international humanitarian law; and *deploring* the long-term consequences of such attacks for the civilian population and the health-care system of the DRC,

Recalling the International Health Regulations (2005), which are contributing to global public health security by improving the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify and respond to public health threats, *underscoring* the importance of abiding by these commitments and *urging* Member States to follow the advice of the WHO Director General regarding the current Ebola outbreak,

Taking note of the cross-border meeting among east African countries held in Entebbe, Uganda, on 3 October 2018, which reviewed the implementation of cross-border disease surveillance activities and the status of emergency preparedness activities in districts that border the DRC and the East African Community; *noting* the need for awareness creation among district leaders in their roles in implementing the IHRs (2005), and *drawing* attention to large-scale population displacements in the region that could contribute to further spread of the Ebola virus,

Underscoring that the control of outbreaks of major infectious diseases requires urgent action and greater national, regional and international collaboration and, in this regard, *stressing* the crucial and continued need for a WHO coordinated international response in the DRC in collaboration with the Government,

Commending Member States and multilateral organizations that have provided crucial assistance, including financial commitments, technical support and in-kind donations, to support the scaling up of emergency efforts to contain the Ebola outbreak and interrupt transmission of the virus, including by providing flexible funds to relevant UN agencies and international organizations, facilitating a more rapid and effective response and enabling them and national governments to purchase supplies and enhance emergency operations in the DRC and neighbouring countries, as well as by collaborating with public and private sector partners to accelerate development of therapeutics, vaccines and diagnostics to treat patients and limit or prevent further infection or transmission,

Welcoming the efforts of the African Union (AU), through the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) in providing support to the government of the DRC, WHO and its partners through a united, comprehensive and collective response to the outbreak, including through the deployment of healthcare workers to the eastern part of the DRC,

Emphasizing the role of all relevant United Nations System entities in supporting the national, regional and international efforts to respond to the Ebola outbreak, and recognizing in this regard the leading role of the WHO,

Taking note of the WHO protocols to prevent the transmission of the Ebola virus disease between individuals, organizations and populations, and *underlining* that the Ebola outbreak can be contained, including through the implementation of established safety and health protocols and other preventive measures that have proven effective,

1. *Reiterates* its deep concern regarding the overall security and humanitarian situation in the DRC, exacerbated by destabilizing activities of foreign and domestic armed groups, recalls the strategic importance of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the DRC and the region, and *reiterates* its call to all signatories to fulfil their respective commitments under this Framework in order to address the root causes of conflict and put an end to recurring cycles of violence, and promote lasting regional development;

2. *Encourages* the government of the DRC, WHO, and other Ebola responders to continue to improve the transparency and accuracy of the daily reporting on the status of the outbreak;

3. *Recalls* that the Government of the DRC bears the primary responsibility to protect civilians within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, including protection from crimes against humanity and war crimes;

4. *Expresses* serious concern regarding the security situation in the areas affected by the Ebola outbreak, which is severely hampering the response efforts and facilitating the spread of the virus in the DRC and the wider region; and *calls for* immediate cessation of hostilities by all armed groups, including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF);

5. *Condemns* in the strongest terms all attacks by armed groups, including those posing serious security risks for responders and jeopardizing the response to the Ebola outbreak;

6. *Demands* that all parties to the armed conflict fully respect international law, including, as applicable, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including their obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the obligations applicable to them under the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977 and 2005, and *further demands* that all parties ensure full, safe, immediate and unhindered access for humanitarian and medical personnel, and their equipment, transport and supplies to the affected areas, and to respect and protect all civilians, including those in the region who are at risk of Ebola, and humanitarian and health workers; *stresses* that humanitarian response teams and hospitals and other medical facilities providing life-saving assistance and relief to those in need must be respected and protected, and that they must not be a target, in accordance with international law;

7. *Notes* the important positive role of MONUSCO, within its existing mandate, in supporting the efforts of the government of the DRC, the WHO and other actors to bring the Ebola outbreak successfully under control and in ensuring, within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians;

8. *Emphasizes* the need for the Government of the DRC, and all relevant actors providing assistance in response to the Ebola outbreak, to enhance efforts to communicate to the public, as well as to implement, the established safety and health protocols and preventive measures to mitigate against misinformation and undue alarm about the transmission and extent of the outbreak among and between individuals and communities; *underscores* the need to enhance community engagement working closely with religious leaders, youth and women's groups and with the families themselves, including in the context of resumed humanitarian assistance efforts;

9. *Emphasizes* that men and women are affected differently by the Ebola outbreak and underlines that a gender-sensitive response that addresses the specific needs of both men and women is required, and *stresses* the importance of the full, active and meaningful engagement of women in the development of such responses;

10. *Stresses* the need for continuous and improved surveillance of those who have been in contact with infected people as well as the need for following-up with Ebola survivors, ensuring they are clinically monitored to prevent any delayed clinical manifestations and the risk of sexual transmission of Ebola; *underlines* the need to provide Ebola survivors with psychological and social support to help them face and overcome possible stigmatization;

11. *Takes note* of WHO's latest assessment of the risk of regional spread and expresses great concern about the potential for the virus to spread into Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan and Burundi and encourages those governments to continue efforts to prepare for operational readiness, in full cooperation with WHO;

12. *Emphasizes* the importance of maintaining international support and engagement — financially, technically and in-kind — to bring the Ebola outbreak successfully under control; stresses in this context the importance of flexible financial support for the response efforts, enabling a more rapid and effective response, *also expresses* concern that the overall humanitarian appeal for the DRC remains severely underfunded;

13. *Encourages* the Government of the DRC and countries of the region to continue efforts to address and resolve the wider political, security, socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences of the Ebola outbreak, as well as to provide sustainable and responsive public health mechanisms;

14. *Requests* all relevant parts of the United Nations System to accelerate their response to the Ebola outbreak, within the overall coordination of WHO, including by supporting the development and implementation of preparedness and operational plans and liaison and collaboration with governments of the region and those providing assistance;

15. *Stresses* the need for the international community to remain engaged in supporting the strengthening of national health systems, in line with the needs of the government of DRC, which are instrumental in preventing a deterioration of the present crisis or addressing a future recurrence;

16. *Welcomes* action and results of the WHO Health Emergencies Programme and *encourages* the WHO and the whole UN system to build on and benefit from the lessons learned from the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa in 2014, and to continue to further strengthen its technical leadership and operational support, monitor Ebola transmission, assist in identifying existing response needs and partners to meet those needs to facilitate the availability of essential data and hasten the development and implementation of therapies and vaccines according to best clinical and ethical practices;

17. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Agenda item 38
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Identical letters dated 16 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of September 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Amal **Mudallali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-18178 (E) 011118 021118

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 16 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations committed in September 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
3 September	0830	The Israeli enemy rehabilitated a dirt road and cleared dry scrub opposite the town of Yarun, in the vicinity of point BP17. The work was carried out by one wheel-loader and two excavators equipped with hydraulic hammers that were accompanied by two Hummer vehicles and 10 personnel. At 1155 hours, the boom of one of the hydraulic hammers crossed the technical fence and violated the Blue Line several times. The incident occurred in the presence of a patrol belonging to the Finnish-Irish contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). At 1800 hours, the Israeli enemy finished work and the vehicles and soldiers left towards occupied territory, but the construction vehicles remained at the location.
9 September	1500	As the Lebanese Army was conducting a patrol on the outskirts of the town of Marun al-Ra's, opposite points B52 and B52 (1), an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and one Defender vehicle arrived on the other side. Three soldiers disembarked, armed their weapons and pointed them towards the personnel of the Lebanese Army patrol. At 1600 hours, the enemy soldiers and their vehicles left in the direction of occupied territory.
11 September	1645	On the outskirts of the town of Aytarun, between points B55 (1) and B55, a fire broke out inside Lebanese territory over an approximately eight-dunum area of scrub. The fire, which extended some four metres south of the Blue Line, caused a landmine that had been planted by the Israeli enemy to explode. A Lebanese Army patrol and Civil Defence personnel arrived on the scene and extinguished the fire.
12 September	1330	As the Israeli enemy continued construction of the separation wall opposite the town of Kafr Killa, enemy personnel pointed the cannon of a Merkava tank positioned at Jabal al-Tayyarah towards Lebanese territory. The tank left at 1430 hours.
	1600	Several explosions were heard from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms/ Hasbayya.
14 September	2320 2355	Inside the occupied Shab'a farms, on the perimeter of the Radar position, the Israeli enemy fired three flare shells.
15 September	1000 1500	The Israeli enemy army positioned a Raccoon Stalker vehicle, equipped with a camera and searchlights mounted on a mast, inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Aytarun. The camera and the searchlights were directed towards Lebanese territory. Enemy soldiers spread out in the area and pointed their weapons towards Lebanese Army forces.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
16 September	1036	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Aytarun, the Israeli enemy pointed the cannon of a Merkava tank for approximately 10 minutes towards Lebanese territory and at an Observer Group Lebanon patrol.
17 September	1555	Several explosions were heard from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
22 September	0910	At the Israeli enemy site north of the Zar'it barracks in occupied Palestinian territory, opposite Ramiya, the Israeli enemy positioned a Raccoon Stalker vehicle equipped with a camera, which was directed towards Lebanese territory. The vehicle left in the direction of occupied territory at 1010 hours.
24 September	0830	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, in the vicinity of point TP37, opposite the town of Udaysah, the Israeli enemy placed a camera atop a vehicle and pointed it towards Lebanese territory.
26 September	2000	From inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy launched four flares over the Radar position.
29 September	1045	On the outskirts of the towns of Hula and Mays al-Jabal, opposite point B71, a fire broke out inside Lebanese territory and spread to the area between points B69 and B72 and then into occupied Palestinian territory, destroying an area of approximately 150 dunums of scrub and trees. The fire caused 16 landmines that had been planted by the Israeli enemy to explode. Civil Defence and UNIFIL personnel arrived on the scene and extinguished the fire. Meanwhile, six vehicles belonging to the Israeli enemy arrived from occupied territory.

Sea violations committed in September 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 September	0846	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011 for four minutes, proceeding on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
3 September	1837	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 280 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
4 September	1830	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 482 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
6 September	0552	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 240 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0654	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for two minutes, proceeding on its way for some 280 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
9 September	1908	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 815 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2225	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of four minutes.
10 September	1221	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 215 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1755 hours, it violated the boundary again for four minutes, proceeding on its way for some 465 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1918 hours, it violated the boundary yet again for two minutes, proceeding on its way for some 455 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1731	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 12 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 570 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
11 September	1841	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 390 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
12 September	0553	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 445 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0633	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for seven minutes, proceeding on its way for some 572 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0646	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 575 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0739	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for two minutes, proceeding on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0914	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 315 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0958	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2009	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 425 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
13 September	1819	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for seven minutes, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1955 hours, it violated the boundary again for seven minutes, proceeding on its way for some 705 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 2130 hours, it violated the boundary yet again for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 815 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 2327 hours, it violated the boundary a fourth time over an 14-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 740 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
14 September	1856	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 445 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
16 September	1808	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for nine minutes, proceeding on its way for some 480 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
19 September	1357	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 290 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1628	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 480 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
20 September	1718	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 465 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
21 September	1746	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for eight minutes, proceeding on its way for some 335 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
23 September	1754	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 482 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
24 September	1805	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for four minutes, proceeding on its way for some 370 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2230	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for five minutes.
	2250	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a five-minute period, broadcast over loudspeakers in Hebrew and sounded warning sirens.
	2253	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for four minutes, proceeding on its way for some 325 metres. The crew of the launch used loudspeakers and searchlights to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
25 September	0149	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 10 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 390 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1412 hours, it violated the boundary again for four minutes, proceeding on its way for some 650 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1426 hours, it violated the boundary yet again for seven minutes, proceeding on its way for some 775 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1415 hours, it violated the boundary a fourth time over a 17-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 830 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1807 hours, it violated the boundary a fifth time over a six-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 390 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1450	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, several bursts of gunfire were directed towards Lebanese territorial waters from an Israeli enemy military launch. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
26 September	1747	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 10 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 725 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
27 September	0704	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for three minutes, proceeding on its way for some 390 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0941	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for 10 minutes, proceeding on its way for some 296 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1032 hours, it violated the again for six minutes, proceeding on its way for some 820 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1745 hours, it violated the boundary yet again for five minutes, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1032	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch sounded warning sirens and broadcast over loudspeakers in Arabic for 30 seconds. At the time, a Lebanese fishing vessel was present inside Lebanese territorial waters.
28 September	1733	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for four minutes, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Air violations committed in September 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 September	0005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0730 hours over Rumaysh.
	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0755 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over Zahlah, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1335 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1025	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Zahlah, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1510 hours over Rumaysh.
	1600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before disappearing from radar screens at 2245 hours over Nabatiyah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2225	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0630 hours on 2 September over Naqurah.
2 September	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1245 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1205	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, the Western Bekaa, Zahlah, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2115 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1215	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2245 hours over Naqurah.
	2150	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0015 hours on 3 September over Yarun.
3 September	0010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 0615 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1340 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1140	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1545 hours over Rumaysh.
	1330	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1630 hours over Rumaysh.
	1500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2330 hours over Aytarun.
4 September	0025	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1315 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0855	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1005 hours over Rumaysh.
	0940	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They circled over Shikka and the South before leaving at 1040 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1455 hours over Rumaysh.
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa, Zahlah, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1805 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Ba'abda and Matn before leaving at 0025 hours on 5 September over Rumaysh.
	1815	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Sidon and proceeding as far as Beirut and Akkar. At 1825 hours, the warplanes disappeared from radar screens over Akkar before reappearing at 1830 hours over the sea west of Beirut. The warplanes left at 1832 over the sea west of Tyre. They also fired decoy flares over Ghusta and Baskinta.
5 September	0005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0520 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0445	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1400 hours over Naqurah.
	1215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1915 hours over Naqurah.
	1540	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over the South before leaving at 1600 hours over Rumaysh.
	1825	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0025 hours on 6 September over Rumaysh.
6 September	0325	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0915 hours over Naqurah.
	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1930 hours over Naqurah.
	1240	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1410 hours over Yarun.
	1255	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1330 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1320	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0850 hours on 7 September over Rumaysh.
	1430	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1515 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1455	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1800 hours over Naqurah.
7 September	0830	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 0900 hours over Rumaysh.
	1355	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2025 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 0325 hours on 8 September over Kafr Killa.
8 September	0315	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0950 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and the South before leaving at 1050 hours over Kafr Killa.
9 September	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1525 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1330 hours over Rumaysh.
	1115	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1315 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
11 September	0925	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2210 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2050	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0645 hours on 12 September over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
12 September	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1610 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2240 hours over Naqurah.
	0800	A Bombardier CL-327 unmanned aerial vehicle violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the town of Zibqin and then headed westward from the south-east at an altitude of approximately 300 m before disappearing out of sight.
	1300	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1430 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1305	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. They circled between Shikka and the South before leaving at 1430 hours over Rumaysh.
	1510	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1710 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0610 hours on 13 September over Naqurah.
13 September	1050	An Israeli enemy agricultural aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the town of Wazzani. It circled over that town before leaving at 1100 hours, heading towards occupied Palestinian territory.
14 September	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1900 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1630 hours over Rumaysh.
15 September	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1745 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1135 hours over Aytarun.
	1755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2210 hours over Naqurah.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	2055	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0510 hours on 16 September over Alma al-Sha'b.
16 September	0010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0920 hours over Rumaysh.
	0920	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, the Western Bekaa and the Shuf before leaving at 1425 hours over Naqurah.
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before disappearing from radar screens at 1140 hours and did not reappear.
	1110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Kafr Shuba.
	1850	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2315 hours over Yarun.
17 September	0935	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa before disappearing from radar screens at 1020 hours. It reappeared at 1310 hours over Marjayoun and circled over the South before leaving at 1900 hours over Rumaysh.
	0950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the Shuf before leaving at 1730 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2300 hours over Naqurah.
18 September	0025	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0715 hours over Rumaysh.
	0820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1915 hours over Kafr Killa.
20 September	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 0900 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before disappearing from radar screens at 1105 hours. It reappeared at 1215 hours over and circled over the South before leaving at 1710 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
21 September	0745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1830 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1000 hours on 22 September over Rumaysh.
22 September	0925	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1550 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1105	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1620 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1320	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the west of Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1805 hours over Naqurah.
	1720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the west of Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2035 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2320 hours over Naqurah.
23 September	0850	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda, Matn and Kasrawan before leaving at 1800 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1235	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1330 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda and the South before leaving at 2135 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2245	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0705 hours on 24 September over Rumaysh.
24 September	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1840 hours over Rumaysh.
	0920	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1805 hours over Yarun.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 0055 hours on 25 September over Alma al-Sha'b.
25 September	0035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 0920 hours over Rumaysh.
	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1610 hours over Yarun.
	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1245 hours over Kafr Shuba.
	1020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1230 hours over Naqurah.
	1255	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1530 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1545	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 0235 hours on 26 September over Rumaysh.
26 September	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2220 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0625	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1600 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1335	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1900 hours over Rumaysh.
	2200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Zahlah and Riyaq before leaving at 0705 hours on 27 September over Rumaysh.
27 September	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2250 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1615 hours over Rumaysh.
	1440	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1515 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2355 hours over Aytarun.
	2300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 0935 hours on 28 September over Alma al-Sha'b.
28 September	1015	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1430 hours over Rumaysh.
	1530	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It circled over the Shuf before leaving at 1700 hours over Naqurah.
	2310	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0920 hours on 29 September over Rumaysh.
29 September	0940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2105 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over the South and the Bekaa before leaving at 1700 hours over Kafr Killa.
30 September	0050	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1820 hours over Rumaysh.
	1640	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2035 hours over Naqurah.

United Nations S/2018/963

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 October 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 25 October 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to draw your attention to Security Council resolution 1966 (2010) of 22 December 2010, by which the Council established the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, and to the statute of the Mechanism annexed thereto.

Article 8 of the statute provides that the Mechanism shall have a roster of 25 independent judges, not more than 2 of whom may be nationals of the same State. The judges shall only be present at the seats of the branches of the Mechanism as necessary at the request of the President to exercise the functions requiring their presence and shall not receive any remuneration or other benefits for being on the roster. The terms and conditions of service of the judges for each day on which they exercise their functions for the Mechanism shall be those of the judges ad hoc of the International Court of Justice.

In a letter dated 22 June 2018 (S/2018/626), I informed the President of the Security Council that I intended to reappoint 23 out of the 25 judges of the Mechanism. In a letter dated 26 June 2018 (S/2018/627), the President of the Security Council informed me that the members of the Council had taken note of my intention. In a letter dated 29 June 2018 (S/2018/652), I informed the President of the Security Council that I was proceeding with the reappointment of 23 out of the 25 judges of the Mechanism. In a letter dated 2 August 2018 (S/2018/756), the President of the Security Council informed me that, having carefully analysed the current situation, the members of the Council reasonably expected that filling the two vacant positions would assist in the effective and timely implementation of the mandate of the Mechanism in accordance with resolution 1966 (2010) and that they had decided that two judges should be elected to the roster of judges of the Mechanism in accordance with article 10 of the statute. The Council also decided that, from the nominations received, the Council would establish a list of not less than three candidates, or, should there be only two nominations, a list of two candidates, taking due account of the qualifications set out in article 9, paragraph 1, of the statute and adequate representation of the principal legal systems of the world, as well as the nationalities of the current judges of the Mechanism.

Article 10, paragraph 1, of the statute provides that the judges of the Mechanism shall be elected by the General Assembly from a list submitted by the Security Council, in the following manner:

(a) The Secretary-General shall invite nominations for judges, preferably from among persons with experience as judges of the International Tribunal for

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> the Former Yugoslavia or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, from States Members of the United Nations and non-member States maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters;
>
> (b) Within 60 days of the date of the invitation of the Secretary-General, each State may nominate up to two candidates meeting the qualifications set out in article 9, paragraph 1, of the statute;
>
> (c) The Secretary-General shall forward the nominations received to the Security Council ...;
>
> (d) The President of the Security Council shall transmit the list of candidates to the President of the General Assembly ... The candidates who receive an absolute majority of the votes of the States Members of the United Nations and of the non-member States maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters, shall be declared elected. Should more than two candidates of the same nationality obtain the required majority vote, the two who received the highest number of votes shall be considered elected.

In the letter dated 2 August 2018, the President requested me to invite States to submit nominations within a period of 60 days. Pursuant to article 10, paragraph 1 (a), of the statute, the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel sent a letter on my behalf on 16 August 2018 to Member States and non-member States maintaining permanent observer missions, inviting nominations of up to two candidates within 60 days of the invitation. By the deadline, eight candidates had been nominated by seven Member States.

In accordance with article 10, paragraph 1 (c), of the statute, I have the honour to forward for the consideration of the Security Council the eight nominations that were received. The list of candidates, in alphabetical order, together with the curricula vitae, has been provided to me in connection with their nominations.* In this regard, I would like to draw the attention of the Council to article 9 of the statute, which provides the following:

> 1. The judges shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices. Particular account shall be taken of experience as judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
>
> 2. In the composition of the Trial and Appeals Chambers, due account shall be taken of the experience of the judges in criminal law, international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law.

In accordance with the letter dated 2 August 2018 from the President of the Security Council, the term of office of the two elected judges will terminate at the same time as the term of office of the judges who are currently on the roster. Pursuant to article 10, paragraph 3, of the statute, the judges shall be eligible for reappointment by the Secretary-General after consultation with the Presidents of the Security Council and of the General Assembly.

I would be grateful if you could bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

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* The information is on file with the Secretariat and is available for consultation.

United Nations S/2018/964

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 October 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 29 October 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Russian Federation and Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

We have the honour to transmit to you a joint statement by the Presidents of the French Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, issued at the quadrilateral summit on Syria, held in Istanbul on 27 October 2018 (see annex).

We should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) François **Delattre**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Christoph **Heusgen**
Ambassador Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Vassily **Nebenzia**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations

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Annex to the letter dated 29 October 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Russian Federation and Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English and Russian]

Joint statement by the Presidents of the Republic of Turkey, the French Republic, the Russian Federation and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Istanbul, 27 October 2018

President of the Republic of Turkey H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the French Republic H.E. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Russian Federation H.E. Vladimir Putin, and Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany H.E. Angela Merkel gathered in Istanbul on 27 October 2018 for a Quadrilateral Summit on Syria.

The Presidents and the Chancellor,

Reviewed the recent developments regarding the conflict in Syria and *expressed* their shared concern on the risks and threats emanating from the conflict for regional as well as global security and stability;

Reaffirmed their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Underlined their firm conviction that there could be no military solution to the ongoing conflict and that the conflict could be resolved only through a negotiated political process in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, and *emphasized*, in this regard, the importance of increased coordination among all international initiatives which aim at contributing to a credible and sustainable solution to the Syrian conflict;

Reaffirmed their determination to fight against terrorism in Syria in order to ultimately eliminate DAESH/ISIL, Al-Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al Qaeda or DAESH/ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the UN Security Council;

Expressed their determination to reject separatist agendas aimed at undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria as well as the national security of neighboring countries;

Welcomed the Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De-escalation Area, signed by the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation in Sochi on 17 September 2018;

Commended the progress in terms of withdrawal of heavy weapons as well as radical groups from the demilitarized zone established pursuant to the Memorandum;

Stressed the importance of a lasting ceasefire, while underlining the necessity to continue fight against terrorism, through the full implementation of the effective measures as foreseen in the Memorandum and of the compliance of all relevant parties with its provisions;

Reaffirmed their strongest opposition to the use of chemical weapons by any party in Syria and *called for* strict compliance by all parties with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction;

Expressed their support for an inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process that is facilitated by the United Nations and *called for* active participation in it of the Syrian parties;

Called for establishing and early convening, considering the circumstances, by the end of the year of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva that would achieve the constitutional reform, paving the way for free and fair elections under the UN supervision and in compliance with the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, with all Syrians, including members of the diaspora, eligible to participate;

Emphasized the importance of implementing confidence-building measures to contribute to the viability of the political process and a lasting ceasefire, and *expressed* their support for the release of detainees/abductees and handover of the bodies as well as the identification of the missing persons, as undertaken by the respective Working Group with the participation of the UN and ICRC experts;

Underscored the need to ensure humanitarian organizations' rapid, safe and unhindered access throughout Syria and immediate humanitarian assistance to reach all people in need in order to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people, and, in this regard, *called upon* the international community, particularly the UN and its humanitarian agencies to increase their assistance to Syria;

Reaffirmed their solidarity with the host countries, in particular Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, and *recalled* that they remain committed to the safe and voluntary return of refugees to Syria on conditions consistent with the international law;

Highlighted the need to create conditions throughout the country for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their original places of residence in Syria, *underlined* that the returnees need security from armed conflict, political persecution or arbitrary arrests as well as humanitarian infrastructure, including water, electricity, health and social services, and *emphasized* the necessity of coordination among all relevant parties, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other specialized international agencies;

Expressed their commitment to working together in order to create conditions for peace and stability in Syria, encourage a political solution and strengthen international consensus in that regard.

The Presidents of the French Republic and the Russian Federation, and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany *expressed* their sincere gratitude to the President of the Republic of Turkey H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for hosting the Quadrilateral Summit in Istanbul.